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SEVERANCE OF JOINT TENANCIES*
ROBERT W.

SWENSON** AND RONAN

E.

DEGNAN***

In their casebook on Property, Professors Myres S. McDougal
and David Haber have adopted this enviable title for the chapter on
concurrent interests: Anachronism Redivivus. 1 These words epitomize rather well the current law relating to joint tenancies. The
subject is thoroughly burdened with concepts which might be
described as archaic if that were not such an understatement. This
Article will examine one facet of joint tenancy law-the right of
one tenant without the consent of the other to "sever" the joint
tenancy and thereby defeat the "right of survivorship" of the other.
As in many other areas of property law, the courts have characterized "severance" with such formulism that there is neither consistency nor clarity in the governing principles.
The nature of the right to sever a joint tenancy is intimately
related to the legal metaphysics which surrounds the joint tenancy
in general. Any definition of joint tenancy is likely to be so riddled
by exceptions that it is tempting to follow Lord Coke's pattern of
discussing it in terms of illustrations. 2 Thus at common law if A
conveyed land to "B and C and their heirs," the grantees were
thought to take as one. If they were not husband and wife, they
held the fee simple as joint tenants. They were seized per my et per
tout, i.e., each was seised of the whole for the purpose of survivorship, and each was seised of a moiety for the purpose of alienation.
During the continuance of the jointure, both were entitled to possession. If B died before C, C's ownership was then exclusive. The
possibility which either had to acquire ownership in severalty by
surviving was a characteristic of the joint tenancy in its inception.
Consequently the survivor took nothing from the deceased tenant."
The entity concept of the joint tenancy is thought to have originated
in the policy of facilitating the collection by the feudal overlords
of the incidents of tenure.4 A splitting of the ownership into separate undivided interests would have made collection more difficult
*This Article does not consider the so-called "joint" bank account.
Further, the writers do not think the bank account cases even analogous;
they have religiously excluded them.
**Professor of Law, University of Utah.
***Assistant Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1. Property Wealth, Land 400 (1948).
2. Co. Litt. *180a.
3. 2 B1. Comm. *183-184.
4. Walsh, History of Anglo-American Law 210 (2d ed. 1932). The
history of co-ownership is related in 3 Holdsworth, History of English
Law 126-128 (3d ed. 1923).
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than if ownership theoretically persisted in an entity. There might
be several tenants, of course, but the pattern was the same. Coke
discussed the joint tenancy in terms of four requirements for its
creation,5 but it has been the words of Blackstone which have found
popularity with the American courts. Over and over again, the
following appears in the opinions:
"The properties of a joint estate are derived from its unity,
which is fourfold: the unity of interest, the unity of title, the
unity of time and the unity of possession; or, in other words,
joint tenants have one and the same interest, accruing by one
and the same conveyance, commencing at one and the same time,
and held by one and the same undivided possession." 6
These "four unities" stem from the entity concept of the joint
tenancy. That they are not always regarded as prerequisites for
the creation of a joint tenancy is clear from the cases.' The idea,
for example, that joint tenants must acquire their title at the same
time seems to be a carry-over from the era when livery of seisin
was the normal method of transferring ownership. Since livery
contemplated a present act, it was impossible for joint tenants as
an entity to acquire their interests at different times. However,
after the Statute of Uses in 1536, a valid joint tenancy might be
created by livery of seisin to X to the use of the children of B
then living or thereafter born. The same was true of a devise to
joint tenants who could not qualify at the same time." Despite the
fact that unity of title ceased to be indispensable to the creation of
a joint tenancy, many courts still feel constrained to hold that A
may not convey to himself and B as joint tenants by a single conveyance." The modern deed is thought to operate as did livery of
seisin so that A cannot be both grantor and grantee. Fortunately
a number of courts have abandoned this sort of reasoning.11
The other unities are not always adhered to. It may perhaps be
possible for joint tenants to possess different estates or different
5. Co. Litt. *180b.
6. 2 Bl. Comm. *180.
7. "This analysis has perhaps attracted attention rather by reason of its
captivating appearance of symmetry and exactness, than by reason of its
practical utility." Challis, Real Property 367 (3d ed., Sweet, 1911).
S. Williams & Eastwood, Real Property 292-293 (based on 24th ed. of

Williams, 1933) ; Challis, op. cit. supra note 7, at 366.
9. E.g., Deslauriers v. Senesac, 331 Il1.437, 163 N. E. 327 (1928) ; Pegg
v. Pegg, 165 Mich. 228, 130 N. W. 617 (1911); Anson v. Murphy, 149 Neb.
716, 32 N. W. 2d 271 (1948), 28 Neb. L. Rev. 117.
10. E.g., Switzer v. Pratt, 237 Iowa 788, 23 N. W. 2d 837 (1946), 45
Mich. L. Rev. 638 (1947) ; Ames v. Chandler, 265 Mass. 428, 164 N. E. 616
(1928) ; Therrien v. Therrien, 94 N. H. 66, 46 A. 2d 538 (1946), 32 Cornell L.
Q. 291. Statutes abolishing the common law rule are listed in Basye, Clearing
Land Titles 405 and n. 9 (1953).
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shares, in which case there is no unity of interest." Unity of possession has not been strictly observed.' 2 There seems to be no
exception, however, to the unity of title-the joint tenancy must
arise from one act, deed or devise.'8
It will be recalled that each of two joint tenants is seised of an
aliquot share for the purpose of alienation. If B and C are joint
tenants, B may convey his interest to X. This was said to result in
a severance of the joint tenancy because two of the four unities no
longer exist. X and C cannot be joint tenants because they did not
acquire their interests at the same time or by the same deed. They
are tenants in common which means that except for the coequal
right to possession, they are in all respects as though they owned
in severalty. 4 The implication is that a joint tenancy exists not
only if the four unities are present when it is created but also only
if they continue to exist. The vast majority of American courts
make this the test of severance. The immediate reaction to this
approach is likely to be: Why be more persistent in requiring a
continuation of the four unities than we are in requiring their existence at the time the tenancy is created? The ultimate question will
be: Is it possible to formulate something more realistic than the
four unities as a yardstick for determining when a severance occurs?
Before the cases dealing with severance are classified, a note
on the judicial attitude toward the joint tenancy in general is in
order. That policy is bound to influence decisions on severance. The
early bias in favor of joint tenancies may have represented a concession to the English landed gentry, as was pointed out above.
But it is certain also that the landowner found the tenancy to work
to his advantage later in avoiding feudal obligations by the device
of the conveyance to uses.'2 After the burdens of feudal tenures
disappeared, the equity courts at least regarded the jus accrescendi
with disfavor.' 6 Traditionally, the American courts have frowned
upon the idea that two persons, unrelated by blood or marriage,
may gamble their fortunes on the chance of survivorship. 7 Except
for the few states in which joint tenancies do not exist, 8 it cannot
11. See notes 35-47 infra.
12. See notes 39, 44, 106 infra.
13. Freeman, Cotenancy and Partition 66 (2d ed. 1866).
14. Challis, op. cit. supra note 7, at 368.
15. Plucknett, Concise History of the Common Law 549 (4th ed. 1948);
Williams & Eastwood, op. cit. spranote 8, at 51-52.
16. 4 Kent Comm. *361.
17. For an excellent statement by Yeates, J., see Caines v. Lessee of
Grant, 5 Binney 119, 122-123 (Pa. 1812).
18. 2 American Law of Property 14-15 (1952). But the courts of those
states seem to have little real aversion to survivorship; they readily create
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be said that the creation of the joint tenancy is contrary to public
policy. True, many states enacted statutes which create a constructional preference for the tenancy in common,' 9 but if the
proper local formula is used, there is no difficulty encountered in
creating the tenancy.20 The small landowner and his spouse today
more than ever before are using the tenancy as a means of avoiding the inconvenience and expense of probate. The current popularity of the joint tenancy has resulted in a noticeable increase in
the number of appellate decisions during the last ten years.
The landowner should be aware, however, of the hazards involved in the use of the joint tenancy. The principal one is the right
of one tenant to effect a severance and destroy the right of survivorship. If an indestructible right of survivorship is desired-that is,
one which may not be destroyed by one tenant-that may be accomplished by creating a joint life estate with a contingent remainder in fee to the survivor; a tenancy in common in simple fee
with an executory interest in the survivor; or a fee simple to take
effect in possession in the future (springing use) .21 The latter device may be particularly useful since it avoids the creation of a
present possessory estate in the person designated to take upon
the death of the conveyor. It possesses also the further advantage
that in most states it may be made contingent upon the conveyee
22

surviving the conveyor.

I.

SEVERANCE BY TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION, CONVEYANCE
OR CONTRACT TO SELL

Testamentary dispositions. It is uniformly held that the right
of survivorship will be preferred to an attempted testamentary
disposition by one tenant of his interest. 23 The theory is that a
it under one guise or another. See Davis v. Davis, 223 S. C. 182, 75 S. E.
2d 46 (1953) ; Runions v. Runions, 186 Tenn. 25, 207 S. W. 2d 1016, 1 A. L. R.
2d 242 (1948) and Note.
19. 2 American Law of Property at 11-12.
20. 2 id. at 13-14.
21. E.g., Papke v. Pearson, 203 Alinn. 130, 280 N. W. 183 (1938) (deed
creating tenancy in common reformed to create contingent springing use);
Anson v. Murphy, 149 Neb. 716, 32 N. W. 2d 271 (1948) (executory interest); Quarm v. Quarm, [1892] 1 Q. B. 184 (contingent remainder).
22. 2 Powell, Real Property §§ 326, 279 (1950) ; 1 Simes, Future Interests § 150 (1936). For the suggestion that joint tenancies might be abolished altogether since the variety of possible future interests give the landowner sufficient latitude in creating survivorship rights, see Niles, The Law
of Estates Since Butler and Kent, 3 Law: A Century of Progress, 18351935 199, 233 (1937).

23. Duncan v. Forrer, 6 Binney 193 (Pa. 1813) (rejecting the argument
that the will constituted a severance because the local Statute of Wills described a testamentary disposition as "conveying ...

land," and holding that
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severance is effective only if made during the tenant's life and a
will does not take effect until after his death.24 It follows that if the
tenant cannot devise his share, he cannot subject it to a lien created
by the will.2 5 If the tenant devises his interest in the joint property

to a stranger and if his spouse, who is the surviving tenant, receives
other property under the will, the latter may be26estopped to deny
the severance if she elects to take under the will.
Inter vivos conveyances. Joint tenants may hold for their lives
or for years as well as in fee simple.27 If a conveyance at common
law was made to "B and C for their lives," the implication was that
it was an estate which continued for the life of the survivor.2 8 A severance of a joint tenancy in a life estate by one tenant would be
beneficial to the lessor since it would result in each holding for his
29
own life.
the statute applied only to "devisable lands" and was not intended to alter
estates) ; Nussbacher v. Manderfield, 64 Wyo. 55, 186 P. 2d 548 (1947). The
survivor may, of course, devise his title. His will is effective without republication if it is broad enough to include all property owned at the time of his
death. Eckardt v. Osborne, 338 Ill. 611, 170 N. E. 774 (1930).
24. A statute providing that death shall sever a joint tenancy influenced
the court to construe an ambiguous deed of the type referred to in note 28,
infra, as creating an indestructible right of survivorship. But the court declined to name or classify the interest created. Davis v. Davis, 223 S. C.
182, 75 S. E. 2d 46 (1953).
Would a conveyance to the use of a joint tenant's last will sever? Baron
Parke thought not: "We will only say that there is no case in point; and we
cannot feel satisfied that the mere surrender to the use of a will in the ordinary
mode, no will having been made during the continuance of the joint tenancy,
can operate to produce a severance." Edwards v. Champion, 3 De G. M. & G.
202, 216 43 Eng. Rep. 80, 85 (1853). But an earlier judge "apprehended" that
it would, though admitting that a will alone would not. Gale v. Gale, 2 Cox 136,
155, 30 Eng. Rep. 63, 71 (1789). We content ourselves with the observation
that the question is unlikely to arise. The problem was raised in Reiss v.
Reiss, 45 Cal App. 2d 740, 746, 114 P. 2d 718, 722 (1941) ; see also note 31
infra.
25. Bassler v. Rewodlinski, 130 Wis. 26, 109 N. W. 1032 (1906).
26. In re Schaech's Will, 252 Wis. 299, 31 N. W. 2d 614 (1948).
27. A conveyance to "B and C and the heirs of their bodies" might
seem to create a joint tenancy in fee tail, but if both were male or both female,
since issue would be impossible, they took as joint tenants for their lives with
several inheritances. Co. Litt. *283; Challis, op. cit. supranote 7, at 365. If one
was male and the other female, apparently the estate would be a special fee
tail.
28. Leake, Digest of Law of Property in Land 145 (2d ed. 1909). Challis,
op. cit. supra note 7, at 368, contends that the addition of express words of
survivorship would be mere surplusage, e.g., "to B and C and to the survivor
of them." It would seem that the phrase might be construed to be a contingent remainder in fee. Certainly today it would present a difficult problem
of construction in view of statutes which eliminate the necessity of words of
inheritance in creating a fee simple. That slight variations in wording may
produce different results is well illustrated by Weber v. Nedin, 210
Wis. 39, 246 N. W. 307 (1933) and Haas v. Haas, 248 Wis. 212, 21 N. W.
2d 398 (1945).
29. Challis, op. cit. supraz note 7, at 368. Severance of a joint tenancy in
a term for years is considered in note 47 infra.
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Joint tenants usually, however, own in fee simple. If all join
in an inter vivos conveyance, the tenancy is terminated. 0 When one
tenant conveys to a stranger, whether the conveyance purports to
transfer the entire fee or merely his share, the joint tenancy is
severed and the remaining tenant becomes a tenant in common with
the conveyee. 31 The conveyance destroys the unities of time and
title. The joint tenancy will not be reestablished if there is a reconveyance to the original joint tenant. 32
If there are two joint tenants, a conveyance by one to the other
ordinarily terminates the tenancy. 33 The Wisconsin court was presented with something of a dilemma in this connection. In Campbell v. Dro-dowics,34 H and W, husband and wife, were joint
tenants. In fraud of creditors, H conveyed to W, and W later conveyed to their daughter, D. C, a creditor of H, thereafter recovered
a judgment against H, but before the levy, H died. C brought suit
against W and D for the purpose of having his claim satisfied out
of H's original one-half interest on the ground that the transfers
were fraudulent conveyances. Defendants contended that they were
entitled to prevail whether the conveyance was set aside or upheld.
If the conveyance were sustained, H had no property to which the
judgment lien could attach; if the conveyance were "set aside," the
joint tenancy was reinstated and W would prevail as survivor, a
judgment lien not being a severance of the joint tenancy. The court,
however, held for the plaintiff on reasoning which is none too clear.
Apparently the court felt that by the conveyance to W there was a
30. Ball v. Mann, 88 Cal. App. 2d 695, 199 P. 2d 706 (1948).
31. Shockley v. Halbig, 24 Del. Ch. 400, 75 A. 2d 512 (1950) ; Davidson
v. Heydon, 2 Yeates 459 (Pa. 1798) (assignment for benefit of creditors) ; see
Jones v. Snyder, 218 Mich. 446, 188 N. W. 505 (1922). To constitute a
severance, the deed must be delivered and otherwise effective to convey title.
Klajbor v. Klajbor, 400 Ill. 513, 94 N. E. 2d 502 (1950). In Reiss v. Reiss,
45 Cal. App. 2d 740, 114 P. 2d 718 (1941), it was held that a conveyance by
one tenant which created a passive use in his favor amounted to a severance.
If the use is executed by the Statute of Uses so that the joint tenant is revested momentarily with the legal title, a rather technical question arises
whether this is tantamount to a conveyance and a reconveyance or whether
the title remains in the conveyee long enough to constitute a severance. Compare Pimbe's Case, Moore 196, 72 Eng. Rep. 578 (1585).
32. Williams v. Williams, 68 R. I. 233, 27 A. 2d 176 (1942); Szymczak
v. Szymczak, 306 Ill. 541, 138 N. E.218 (1923).
33. At common law the conveyance would be by release rather than
livery since each already was seised of the whole fee. Challis, op. cit. supra
note 7, at 369 n.; Restatement, Property § 29, comment e (1944) ; see In re
Lorch's Estate, 33 N. Y. S. 2d 157, 165-166 (Surr. Ct. 1941). In In re Cotter's
Estate, 159 Misc. 324, 287 N. Y. Supp. 670 (Surr. Ct. 1936), a tenant who purported to convey his "undivided one-half right, title and interest" to the other
later contended that his right of survivorship did not pass by the deed. It was
held that either there was a destruction of all the unities and therefore a termination of the joint tenancy or there was a merger of the estates which destroyed the original tenancy.
34. 243 Wis. 354, 10 N. W. 2d 158 (1943).
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"severance" or "termination" of the joint tenancy in such a way
that it could not be revived when the conveyance was set aside.
Giving retroactive effect to the adjudication setting aside the conveyance, H and W would be regarded as tenants in common. C's
judgment lien would then, of course, attach to H's interest.
It is generally assumed that joint tenants must have the same
interest. There is considerable uncertainty as to when there is a
destruction of the unity of interest so as to create a severance.
Unity will exist at the time the joint tenancy is created. A severance may, however, modify the individual shares. If A, B and C
are joint tenants and A conveys his share to D, there is no doubt
that B and C continue as joint tenants of an undivided two-thirds.5
D, as tenant in common with B and C, owns an undivided one-third.
But suppose A conveys merely one-half of his moiety to D. If the
original tenancy persists in A, B and C, their shares would no
longer be equal, and the general rule stated above would be subject
to an exception. Freeman suggests that the alienation may perhaps
create two joint tenancies: one-half in A, B and C; one-third in
B and C. D would own one-sixth as tenant in common.3" It would
seem that the unity of interest requirement applies only to the interest which is the subject matter of the tenancy. The subject
matter may be an undivided interest. The remaining undivided in37
terest may be owned exclusively by one of the joint tenants.
Does "unity of interest" mean that both tenants must continue
to own the same estate? Will an alteration in the estates (as distinguished from the shares) of the joint tenants effect a severance?
The texts state that if A and B are joint tenants for their lives and
B acquires the reversion in fee simple, there is a severance because
B's two estates merge with the result that the two tenants possess
different estates. A and B are said to be tenants in common for the
balance of A's life. 38 The effect of the severance upon A is to deprive
him of the right to exclusive possession for his life if he survives B.
35. Or, if A conveyed his share to B, B would become a tenant in common as to one-third, but B and C remain joint tenants of the balance. Morgan
v. Catherwood, 95 Ind. App. 266, 167 N. E. 618 (1929) ; Walsh, Commentaries on the Law of Real Property 11 (1947). Or, A might sever the joint
tenancy by conveying to X and with reconveyance make himself and D joint
tenants of the undivided one-third. Smith v. Lombard, 201 Cal. 518, 258 Pac.
55 (1927).
36. Freeman, op. cit. supra note 13, at 64.
37. In re Galletto's Estate, 75 Cal. App. 2d 580, 171 P. 2d 152 (1946);
see Note, 10 Minn. L. Rev. 325, 330 (1926).
38. Radcliffe, Real Property Law 35-36 (1933); BI. Comm. *186. A
fine point, but perhaps it should be said that A and B are joint tenants for
the life of A. The result is the same. A joint tenancy in a life estate pur autre
vie is possible even though the person whose life is the measurement of the
estate is one of the joint tenants. Another way of stating this is that the right

1954]

SEVERANCE OF JOINT TENANCIES

Is there a severance also when one of two joint tenants in fee
simple purports to convey an estate less than a fee simple? The
California court in Hammond v. McArthur" held that there was
no severance where one joint tenant, A, purported to convey a
"full life estate" to his cotenant, B. At B's death, A was entitled to
the whole interest by virtue of his surviving. In a case of this
type, clarity is not promoted by talking in terms of merger. To say
that there is a merger is simply to state a conclusion as to the
existence of a severance. 40 Merger will exist or not depending upon
whether there is any purpose to be served in regarding the estates
as separate interests. 4' But does a severance result because of a
break in the unities of interest and possession? In the Hammond
case, Schauer, J., concurred on the ground that the conveyance did
"not destroy any essential element of a joint tenancy."4 2 One writer
has suggested that the judge may have had in mind that the requirement of unity of interest is actually observed by holding that the
joint tenancy continues to exist in the future interest only and that
the unity of possession still exists because the possession of "one
joint tenant with the consent of his cotenant is the possession of
both." 4 3 The majority opinion, on the other hand, seems to proceed
upon the assumption that a severance does not occur unless the
parties have indicated an intention to terminate the right of survivorship by doing something which is inconsistent with the right.44
This test is more desirable than the four unities test. Agreements
between joint tenants with respect to the possession of the land
should not be held to be inconsistent with the survivorship right.
In the Hammond case, suppose A had purported to convey a
life estate in his share to X instead of to his cotenant. Since A has
the privilege of severing the joint tenancy by conveying in fee
simple without B's consent, he may with equal freedom create in
of survivorship "does not necessarily confer equal advantage upon all."
Challis, op. cit. supra note 7, at 366. Compare Note, 10 Minn. L. Rev. 325,

327 (1926).

39. 30 Cal. 2d 512, 183 P. 2d 1 (1947). In Greiger v. Pye, 210 Minn.
71, 297 N. W. 173 (1941), the court suggested that a conveyance to A and B
as joint tenants, subject to a life estate in A, may fail as a joint tenancy
because it lacks unity of possession. The point was not stressed because B
subsequently conveyed to A, terminating the tenancy.
40. If there is a merger, B would own an undivided one-half in fee
simple in possession, and A would own a future interest in an undivided
one-half expectant upon the termination of B's life estate in an undivided
one-half.
41. 1 Fraser, Cases on Property 369 n. (2d ed. 1941).
42. 30 Cal. 2d 512, 516, 183 P. 2d 1, 3 (1947).
43. 36 Calif. L. Rev. 133, 135 (1948).
44. The court relied upon cases like Tindall v. Yeates, 392 Ill. 502, 64
N. E. 2d 903 (1946), note 106 infra and text thereto.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:466

another an estate which is less than a fee simple but which has a
potential duration longer than A's own life. The possibility that
X's life estate may continue beyond A's death is inconsistent with
a complete right of survivorship. There are two possible solutions:
either there is a total45 or a partial severance.40 The former is the
preferable solution. A partial severance would mean that the tenancy is temporarily severed during the existence of the life estate.
The joint tenancy continues in the reversion and is revived when
the life estate terminates. If X dies before A, or if B dies before A,
this theory is easily applied. If X, however, outlives A, it must be
concluded either (1) that X's estate terminates upon the death of
A, in which case A has merely succeeded in conveying to him a life
estate pur autre vie which seems inconsistent with A's freedom of
severance, or (2) that X's estate does not terminate but is good as
against the survivor. The latter alternative seems inconsistent with
the joint tenancy theory of survivorship. The partial severance
approach is undesirable because the question of severance cannot be
determined until it is possible to ascertain the actual duration of
X's estate. Another argument for adopting the complete severance
theory is that there is a break in the unity of possession. Unlike
the Hammond situation, it is difficult here to say that X's possession
is the possession of both cotenants; in the rare case, perhaps the
consent of both could be spelled out. The analysis adopted here
would also result in finding a total severance whenever one tenant
conveys a term for years which has a potential duration greater
than the lessor's life. What authority exists is, however, contrary to
this position.4 7 If both tenants join in a conveyance of that estate.
it would not seem that there is necessarily a severance.
The conveyance by one joint tenant of a future interest may
also be inconsistent with the continued existence of the right of
survivorship. In the leading English case of Clerk v. Clerk,48 Lady
Turner and Arabella Clerk, sisters, were joint tenants. Arabella
made a lease of her moiety to her daughter for eighty years to com45. Challis, op. cit. supra note 7, at 367 n.; Note, 25 Calif. L. Rev. 203,

206 (1937).
46. 2 Walsh, op. cit. supra note 35, at 15.
47. Swartzbaugh v. Sampson, 11 Cal. App. 2d 451, 54 P. 2d 73 (1936)
(no severance; survivorship not involved, however) ; cf. Eagle Oil & Ref. Co.
v. James, 52 Cal. App. 2d 669, 126 P. 2d 880 (1942). The English cases appear to favor a temporary severance. See Napier v. Williams, [1911] 1 Ch.
361; Palmer v. Rich, [1897] 1 Ch. 134; Doe ex dent. Marsack v. Read, 13
East 57, 104 Eng. Rep. 23 (K.B. 1810) ; Roe v. Lonsdale, 12 East 39, 104
Eng. Rep. 16 (K.B. 1810). If one joint tenant for a term for years leases for
a lesser term, it has been held that a severance results. Sym's Case, Cro. Eliz.
33, 78 Eng. Rep. 809 (Ch. 1687).
48. 2 Vern. 323, 23 Eng. Rep. 809 (Ch. 1694).
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mence upon the lessor's death and added, rather ungrammatically,
"if the Lady Turner should so long live." The daughter thus received a contingent term for years in futuro. The report of the case
states that the joint tenancy is severed and that "the lease of her
moiety will be good against the survivor." The decision does not
indicate whether there is a total or partial severance. Since the
lease was to commence in possession upon the death of the conveying tenant, it would appear that the intention was to destroy the
right of survivorship. On the basis of this decision, there seems to
be little doubt but that a future interest in fee simple, whether
contingent or vested, limited to take effect in possession upon the
death of the conveyor would sever the joint tenancy. 49 The Illinois
court in a well-reasoned opinion has recently so held. 50 It is not
material whether the future interest is described as a remainder
or a springing use. It may also be contingent upon the conveyor
dying before the other tenant. This is not inconsistent with the cases
dealing with testamentary dispositions because the conveyance of
the future interest is a present, irrevocable transfer. It is no more
testamentary than any fee to commence in possession upon the death
of the conveyor.
Contracts to sell. A valid contract by one joint tenant to convey his interest severs the joint tenancy in equity. 51 If the vendor
dies before the conveyance is made, the purchaser is entitled to a
49. In Green v. Skinner, 185 Cal. 435, 438, 197 Pac. 60, 61 (1921), it
the joint tenancy] even though it be but a conveyance of a remainder after
the death of the cotenant making the conveyance." The case held that a delivery of a deed to an escrow agent with instructions to hand it to the grantee
is stated, by way of dictum: "The conveyance will have this effect [to sever

upon the death of the grantor was not effective against the surviving tenant on

the ground that the grantee had no knowledge of the existence of the deed
until after the grantor's death. The grantee's acceptance was not given re-

troactive effect so as to destroy the surviving tenant's claim. This aspect
of the case seems unnecessarily favorable to the surviving tenant. If the
deed had been delivered and accepted during the grantor's life, the court
would have held, as the dictum indicates, that it created a future interest
which severed the joint tenancy. An erroneous reading of the case accounts
for contrary statements in 2 Walsh, op. cit. supra note 35, at 15; and 2 American Law of Property 11 (1952).
50. Klouda v. Pechousek, 414 Ill. 75, 110 N. E. 2d 258 (1953).
51. Ibid.; Naiburg v. Hendrikson, 370 Ill. 502, 19 N. E. 2d 348 (1939).
(These cases involved deeds of land, the title to which had been registered
under the Torrens Act. An Illinois statute provided that unregistered deeds
of Torrens property operate as contracts to convey). In Kurowski v. Retail
Hardware Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 203 Wis. 644, 234 N. W. 900 (1931), H and W
were joint tenants. H, engaged in a partnership enterprise with his son, S,
orally agreed that the premises should belong to the partnership. It was
assumed that there was sufficient part performance to obtain specific performance of this contract. The question of severance arose after W's death, in connection with a fire insurance policy which required that the insured (the
partnership) be the sole and unconditional owner. Held, that the insured was
the sole owner because there was no severance of the joint tenancy by the
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deed from the vendor's administrator rather than from his heir,
since the contract works an equitable conversion of the property
interests of the parties.52 After the purchaser secures a conveyance,
he is a tenant in common with the original joint tenant.
A new and especially frightening application of severance and
the "unities" rule has but recently arisen. It is here treated in detail
because the problem is new and because of the grave and wholly unnecessary danger to land titles created by two recent opinions. The
latest and worst is Buford v. Dahlke,5 3 from Nebraska. H and W,
joint tenants, executed an installment contract for deed. The price
was less than half paid when H died; between his death and the time
of suit the vendees had paid to W two hundred dollars. The administrator of H sued the vendees for one half of the payments due between the time of H's death and the commencement of the action,
and for a declaratory judgment that one-half of the future payments
were assets of H's estate, payable to the administrator. The court
held that at the time of H's death the contract and all interests under
it were held in tenancy in common, and that one-half of the then
unpaid purchase price was an asset of the estate. Ownership of the
retained legal title was not directly involved, but the irresistible
implication is that a conveyance by W after full payment of the
purchase price will not suffice; conveyances will also have to be
obtained from the administrator, beneficiaries, heirs or creditors of
H. The plain holding-relating to the purchase price-will create
great practical inconvenience; the clear implication-relating to title
-is disastrous. A good many Minnesota titles are based on conveyances executed by a surviving grantor-joint tenant. If the rule
of the Buford case is sound, those titles are now highly suspect, at
best.
contract. The court accepted the general rule that a contract by one tenant
severs the joint tenancy, but construed the agreement as contemplating that
H would convey only if he obtained the entire title by survivorship. On the
construction point, the case seems doubtful.
Spadoni v. Frigo, 307 Ill. 32, 35-36, 138 N. E. 226, 227-228 (1923), by
way of dictum, seems to indicate that specific performance of a binding contract entered into by one joint tenant is discretionary. It was said that the
court will take into consideration the fact that the conveyance would sever the
joint tenancy in determining whether to grant specific performance.
The English cases hold that a contract by one tenant is a severance. E.g.,
Gould v. Kemp, 2 My. & K. 304, 39 Eng. Rep. 959 (1834) ; see Brown v.
Raindle, 3 Ves. 256, 257, 30 Eng. Rep. 998, 999 (Ch. 1796). These and other
English cases are discussed in Note, 32 Iowa L. Rev. 539, 540 n. 6-9 (1947).
52. Under the equitable conversion doctrine, the vendor holds the legal
title as security for the payment of the purchase price. This security interest
is personal property. The interest of the vendee is treated in equity as real
property because he is entitled to compel a conveyance. McClintock, Equity
286 (2d ed. 1948).
53. 62 N. W. 2d 252 (Neb. 1954).
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The reasoning upon which this unfortunate result is based is
indefensible. It contains the following:
A. The court said that it was important to realize that the doctrine of equitable conversion applied, with the vendees owning the
real estate and the vendors personal property. But the question was
ownership of a promise to pay money. There is no reason to convert it into personal property-it has never been anything else.
B. Ownership of the title retained for security purposes is another problem. The court said the contract to convey severed even
though executed by all of the joint tenants: "They had neither title
to the real estate, interest in, nor possession of it after the contract
of sale was made."54 Even if we assume the validity of the "unities"
test, this is erroneous. Considered separately:
1. In the theory of property law, somebody has title, and clearly the vendees have not. And the court expressly says that the
vendors retained it. Nothing has happened to it; proportions
of ownership are undisturbed. How can there be anything
but a "unity of title ?" But ". . . this they held as trustees." 55
From the earliest recorded examples of feoffments to uses to
the modern trust indenture trustees have held legal title as
joint tenants with right of survivorship.5 Trusts can hardly
function if they do not.
2. The reason the court finds no unity of interest is that they
thought there was no interest at all. Is a security interest no
interest? Despite the statement of the court, there is clearly
a vital interest remaining in the vendors, and the proportion
of ownership-the "unity"--has not been changed.
3. Does unity of possession require actual possession? Certainly
not; we can have joint tenancy in a reversion or remainder,
and even in a possibility of reverter.5 7 Would a lease executed
54. Id. at 257. In Minnesota the interest of the vendor is regarded as
real estate. "His interest, spoken of as the fee, is bound by the lien of a
judgment against him.... He has an interest which he may mortgage ....
and, it has been said, he is in a strict sense the owner of the land until the
purchase price is paid. . . . No one would contend that he could transfer
his interest as personalty without his wife joining." In re Consolidation of
School Districts, 146 Minn. 403, 405, 178 N. W. 892, 892-893 (1920).
55. 62 N. W. 2d at 257.
56. See 1 American Law of Property § 1.18 (1952) ; 1 Scott, Trusts §
103 (1939).
57. In Mundy v. Mundy, 296 Mich. 578, 296 N. W. 685 (1941), H had
contracted to convey. Thereafter he married and conveyed to himself and W
as joint tenants; the court held that TV took by survivorship at H's death. Even
Blackstone, who really believed in unities, recognized that a reversion or
remainder could be held in joint tenancy. 2 Bl. Comm. *179, 182. Greiger v.
Pye, 210 Minn. 71, 297 N. W. 173 (1941), involved a curious situation. A
was a tenant for life; A and B were joint tenants in the remainder. The
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by both joint tenants destroy their right of survivorship because their interest-the reversion-is non-possessory?
These reasons given by the court do not bear even a casual
examination. In addition to what is said above, they cite a number
of cases holding that a contract to convey executed by one joint
tenant alone will destroy the right of survivorship. This is the rule
without exception,58 and it is perfectly sound. The one who executed
the conveyance has deprived his co-tenant of any possibility of
taking by survivorship. But where both contract to convey, their
mutual rights are unchanged. By any test, the result is unsound if
based on the reasons given so far. The best test suggested is prejudice to the rights of a cotenant-none has occurred. If intent to sever
controls, there is complete absence of any intent to destroy survivorship. If the traditional test of destruction of a unity is applied, we
find that no unity has been affected.
The court cited a California case59 for the proposition that a conveyance by all joint tenants destroys the joint tenancy. But that
was a gratuitous conveyance on trust for another; the grantors retained no interest in the property and received nothing in exchange
for it. Of what would they be joint tenants? Another case closer to
the point is cited. In 1953 the Iowa court held that a contract for
deed executed by both joint tenants destroyed the right of survivorship, and that therefore the interest of the survivor passed under a
clause of her will dealing with property of her estate generally and
not under a clause disposing of interests she acquired as surviving
spouse. 60 The Iowa court made the unsupported and unconsidered
court was skeptical, but disposed of the cases on another ground. 210 Minn.
at 75, 297 N. W. at 175. The opinion is a mess. Cookinan v. Silliman, 2 A. 2d
166 (Del. Ch. 1938), held that joint tenants who granted a determinable fee,
retaining a possibility of reverter, held the latter subject to survivorship. Upon
termination of the base fee, the whole estate vested in heirs of the survivor.
58. See note 51 .supra.
59. Ball v. Mann, 88 Cal. App. 2d 695, 199 P. 2d 706 (1948).
60. In re Sprague's Estate, 57 N. W. 2d 212 (Iowa 1953), 38 Iowa L.
Rev. 587. The case is contrary to a prediction in Note, 32 Iowa L. Rev. 539,
541 (1947), though the writer takes the position that the proceeds may be
owned as tenants in common while the retained title is subject to survivorship. Iowa Land Title Examination Standard 4.11 takes the position that the
vendee must obtain deeds from both the survivor and the administrator, heirs,
etc., of the deceased joint tenant. The standard is not directly applicable to the
Sprague case because devolution of the purchase price only was there involved. But the standards committee apparently does not recognize the distinction, since the appended Comment says the standard is based on the assumption that the contract contained no provision that the sale proceeds were payable to the vendors as joint tenants. Nor will prudent Iowa lawyers rely upon
the distinction in rendering title opinions. The Chairman of the Title Standards
Committee
of the Iowa State Bar Association regards the Sprague case as
"complete vindication"
of the standard, though he acknowledges that it has
been the subject of criticism. Marshall, Development of Title Examination
Standardsin Iowa, 38 Iowa L. Rev. 534, 539 (1953). The opinion in Sprague
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statement that the contract severed, each thereafter owning an undivided one-half. On the narrow holding that the beneficial interest
in the right to receive payment is not subject to survivorship, both
courts may be correct; the point is examined below. But to the extent that the cases imply that the legal title as security is severed
into a tenancy in common, they are contrary to authority6 ' and
will create the greatest confusion in land titles.
A pertinent question is whether the promise to pay money is,
when acquired by the vendors, subject to a right of survivorship
between them. The Nebraska court says that it is not because there
are no words in the contract indicating an intention to create survivorship, necessary under Nebraska law-.6 This is a somewhat uncertain point. Littleton, 3 Coke64 and Blackstone 5 all indicate that
the common law presumption in favor of joint tenancy applied to
both realty and personalty. The presumption has been generally reversed by statute,66 but most of the statutes talk the language of
real property and appear in code chapters on real property. Do they
also apply to personalty? The general tendency is to say that they
do,6 7 despite the phrasing. The New York statute" speaks of
"Every estate granted or devised.... ." New York clearly holds that
this covers personalty.60 Michigan has an identical provision 70 but
has solved the problem without reference to the statute; it is there
held that the presumption of joint tenancy never applied to chatdoes not mention the standard, but the supreme court adopted the opinion

of the lower court on the point of severance. Whether the standard was urged
upon the trial judge is unknown. In Siedel v. Snider, 241 Iowa 1227, 44 N. W.
2d 687 (1950) the court recognized standard 9.18 as representing the practices of the bar.
For a critical comment on the case and the standard, see Note, Iowa
Land Title Standards I, 2 Drake L. Rev. 76, 90-91 (1953). Candor compels
an admission that both of the writers of this Article were on the Drake
faculty at that time; the student author may have been influenced.
61. In re Estate of Jogminas, 246 Ill. App. 518 (1927); Simon v.

Chartier, 250 Wis. 642, 27 N. W. 2d 752 (1947) ; cf. Childs v. Childs, 293
Mass 67, 199 N. E. 333 (1935). A contract which evidences intent to sever
will be given that effect. Kozacik v. Kozacik, 157 Fla. 597, 26 So. 2d 659
(1946).
62. 62 N. W. 2d at 258.
63. Litt. §§ 281-282 (Wambaugh trans. 1903).
64. Co. Litt. *182a. Coke notes an exception as to the goods, including
"debts," of joint merchants.
65. 2 BI. Comm. *399. See also Williams, Personal Property 520 (18th
ed., Williams, 1926).
66. See 2 American Law of Property § 6.3 (1952).
67. Id. § 6.4; Note, 144 A. L. R. 1465 (1943).
68. N. Y. Real Prop. Law § 66.
69. Matter of Kimberly, 150 N. Y. 90, 44 N. E. 945 (1896). A mortgage
is owned in tenancy in common. Matter of Blumenthal, 236 N. Y. 448, 141
N. E. 911 (1923).
70. Mich. Comp. Laws § 544.44 (1948).
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tels.71 The same language in the Wisconsin statutes 72 has never
been construed. The Minnesota section is more restrictive; it applies to "All grants and devises of lands. . . ." except mortgages,
and devises or grants in trust or to executors. 7 3 The statute seems

not to reach the common law presumption in this state, if any in
fact existed. The Minnesota court has not had occasion to decide
the question; the only hint is the concluding sentence of Peterson
v. Lake City Bank & Trust Co.: "A joint tenancy may exist in personal property, and it may be established by parol though here there
is supporting documentary evidence.

' 74

If the common law pre-

sumption prevails, evidence of intent should be unnecessary. This is
a very slim hint indeed. Policy argues for a presumption against
joint tenancy. An arbitrarily imposed survivorship is as "odious"
and "objectionable" now as it was two hundred years ago; it would
be unfortunate if the court were deliberately to create a presumption
in favor of it today, despite the narrow wording of the statute.
If the common law presumption as to personalty still prevailed
generally, the Nebraska case might be distinguished as an aberration of local law. But they seem to be in accord with the majority in
holding that the note is owned in tenancy in common. Does this
mean that the case is correctly decided, and that Minnesota, for
example, should reach the same result? Fortunately, it does not.
It was the rule at common law 5 and is the rule today, in Minnesota7 as elsewhere7 7 that payment to one of several joint obligees
discharges the entire obligation, absent fraud and the like. The rule
does not depend on any idea of survivorship. Payment to one of
the joint obligees during the lifetime of all, before survivorship be71. Wait v. Bovee, 35 Mich. 425 (1877). Only over strong protest was

the court able to hold, in Lober v. Dorgan, 215 Mich. 62, 183 N. W. 942
(1921), that joint tenancy in personalty was possible at all.
72. Wis. Stat. § 230.44 (1951). See Fiedler v. Howard, 99 Wis. 388, 393,
75 N. W. 163, 165 (1898). In a most curious case, the Wisconsin court held
that benefits payable to two persons under an insurance policy were analogous
to a devise of land, and therefore within an exception to the statute. Farr v.
Trustees of Grand Lodge, 83 Wis. 446, 53 N. W. 738 (1892). See also
Abdullah v. Malone, 214 Wis. 336, 252 N. W. 158 (1934) and Williams v.
Jones, 175 Wis. 380, 185 N. W. 231 (1921).
73. Minn. Stat. § 500.19(2) (1949).
74. 181 Minn. 128, 131, 231 N. W. 794, 795 (1930).
75. 2 Corbin, Contracts § 939 (1951).
76. Delaney v. Fritz, 221 Minn. 190, 21 N. W. 2d 479 (1946) ; Moore v.
Bevier, 60 Minn. 240, 62 N. W. 281 (1895) ; Flanigan v. Seelye, 53 Minn. 23,
55 N. W. 115 (1893).
77. Cober v. Connolly, 20 Cal. 2d 741, 128 P. 2d 519 (1942), 144 A. L. R.
367 (1943) and Note; Mathews v. De Foor, 172 Ga. 318, 158 S. E. 7 (1931) ;
Dewey v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 256 Mass. 281, 152 N. E. 82 (1926):
Hill v. Breedeen, 53 Wyo. 125, 79 P. 2d 482 (1938) ; 2 Corbin, Contracts §
939 (1951) ; 2 Williston, Contracts § 343 (rev. ed. 1936) ; Restatement, Contracts § 130 (1932). But cf. U. C. C. § 3-116 (Official Draft 1952) ; Note, 1
Stan. L. Rev. 730, 732-737 (1949).
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comes relevant, is effective. The obligees must settle accounts among
themselves when all are living,7 and the executor of a deceased
joint obligee may compel an accounting by a survivor who has collected.70 Neither the Nebraska nor the Iowa court mentioned this
rule. It seems inconceivable that they would have reached the results
they did if the case had been properly presented. Iowa, in fact,
could still reach that result; they did not hold that payment to the
survivor would not suffice.
It seems preposterous to suggest that one who is entitled to
discharge the obligation by receiving payment is not also enabled
to discharge the security interest by executing the warranty deed
called for by the contract. And a survivor can, if joint tenancy is
still applicable to the legal title retained.80
The retained security title is analagous to a purchase money
mortgage; despite significant differences, the two are used interchangeably in home and farm financing. Delaney v. Fritz' settled
the identical problem in Minnesota mortgage law. The issue was
whether payment of the note to two of three owners of a mortgage
discharged the note and mortgage. The court held that it did, entering a permanent injunction against foreclosure. The opinion stated:
"Where an undivided debt secured by mortgage is owed to two
or more creditors, it may, when due or thereafter, be paid to
either or any one of such creditors, and the one or ones to
whom it is paid may effectually discharge the debt and mortgage .. The rights of the creditors, as between themselves,
are not here involved. 82
While it may well be argued that a mortgage to two or more
persons is subject to survivorship under Minnesota law,83 that conclusion is not necessary to support the Delaney case. The mortgagees were all still living, and survivorship between them was
irrelevant. Further, the court clearly intimates that an accounting
between them may be required.
78. See Cober v. Connolly, 20 Cal. 2d 741, 745, 128 P. 2d 519, 521 (1942),
142 A. L. R. 367 and Note; Hill v. Breedeen, 53 Wyo. 125, 139, 79 P. 2d 482,
487 (1938); 2 Corbin, Contracts § 939 (1951); Restatement, Restitution §
125(2), comment b (1937).
79. Park v. Parker, 216 Mass. 405, 103 N. E. 936 (1914).
80. Simon v. Chartier, 250 Wis. 642, 27 N. W. 2d 752 (1947).
81. 221 Minn. 190, 21 N. W. 2d 479 (1946). A contract for deed transaction isthe equivalent of a purchase money mortgage in Minnesota. See First
& American Nat. Bank v. Whiteside, 207 Minn. 537, 542-543, 292 N. W.
770, 774 (1940) ; Nolan v. Greeley, 150 Minn.441, 442-443, 185 N. W. 647-648
(1921).
82. 221 Minn. at 191, 21 N. W. 2d at 480.
83. Minn. Stat. § 500.19(2) (1949) expressly excepts mortgages from
the statutory presumption in favor of tenancy in common. Wisconsin has
found that a note and mortgage were held in joint tenancy because of an
identical statute. Fiedler v. Howard, 99 Wis. 388, 75 N. W. 163 (1898).
But cf. Williams v. Jones, 175 Wis. 380, 185 N. W. 231 (1921).
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This rule is not a peculiarity of Minnesota law. It is the general
rule throughout the country. 84 The burden on a mortgagor would
be materially increased if he were required to keep track of relationships between the obligees and persons who claim under them.
He has promised but a single performance and should not be required to make many. He must know whom to pay and from whom
he can get a valid satisfaction of the mortgage. The vendee under a
contract for deed requires exactly the same protection, and the same
rule must apply to him.
A final observation on the contract for deed cases: if the execution of the contract "severs," will forfeiture of the vendee's interest
upon default revive survivorship? A substantial number of Iowa
conveyancers will be horrified to find that it does not, if that is in
fact the case. But the title quieting business will boom.
Effect of failure to record severance deed. As indicated above,
either tenant has the power to sever the joint tenancy by conveying an undivided interest during his life. If the conveyance is not
recorded, may the surviving joint tenant claim priority over the
grantee of the unrecorded deed? The failure to record, it would
seem, will affect the grantee's claim only if the local recording act
applies. No doubt a recorded severance deed would be effective
against the surviving tenant. Even if unrecorded, it is probably
valid since the surviving tenant may not be a "purchaser" under the
recording act. He takes under the instrument creating the joint
tenancy by virtue of the right of survivorship which existed from
the inception of the joint tenancy. He does not take from the deceased tenant. Perhaps a bona fide purchaser from the surviving
tenant might be in a better position than the surviving tenant himself.8 5 Even if the surviving tenant is a "purchaser," he would not
be able to qualify under recording acts which extend their protection only to purchasers who record first.
It is surprising that there is so little authority on these prob84. Park v. Parker, 216 Mass. 405, 103 N. E. 936 (1914). The court
held that the mortgagees were tenants in common, yet permitted a payment
in full to one of them to discharge the note and mortgage. Cober v. Connolly, 20 Cal. 2d 741, 128 P. 2d 519 (1942). See 2 Glenn, Mortgages § 312
(1943). But if one mortgage secures several different obligations, payment to
one will not discharge the mortgage or the other obligations. Burnett v.
Pratt, 22 Pick. 556 (Mass. 1839) ; 1 Glenn, Mortgages § 20.02 (1943).
85. In a comment prepared by former students of the authors in a course
in Conveyances, it was urged that a bona fide purchaser from the survivor
may claim the protection of the recording act An analogy was drawn to a
purchaser from the heir of an owner who had previously conveyed by an unrecorded deed. See The Iowa Title Standards I, 2 Drake L. Rev. 76, 86
(1953). Cf. Pepin v. Stricklen, 114 Cal. App. 32, 299 Pac. 557 (1931).

86. The problem was overlooked in Shelton v. Vance, 106 Cal. App. 2d
194, 234 P. 2d 1012 (1951).
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lems. s8 A number of state bar associations have adopted title
standards which permit the title examiner to approve a title based
upon a deed from a surviving joint tenant simply by showing that
the one tenant is dead and that state and federal inheritance taxes
on his estate have been paid.87 No reference is made to the possibility of the title being defective because of an unrecorded severance. If the title is assumed to be defective, the examiner is thus
in the position of having to reject a title because of a defect, the
existence of which cannot possibly be discovered. In some states,
statutory procedures apparently authorize a proceeding to establish the title of the surviving tenant, but these seem to be regarded
as optional by title examiners. s8
Two Illinois decisions indicate that there is justification for the
conclusion that the surviving joint tenant's title is defective if
there has been an unrecorded severance deed."' The cases involved
unregistered deeds to land under the Torrens system (as distinguished from the recording system). The unregistered deed by one
joint tenant operated under the Torrens system as a contract to
convey. In the earlier case, the court held that the equity represented by the unregistered deed (contract) was valid against the survivor. Since this is a case of first impression, it will serve some purpose to observe the court's reasoning:
"While we have been unable to find any cases on the question of whether survivorship in a joint tenancy is an intervening right, we are of the opinion that it is not. The joint tenancy
was severed, in equity, by the contract to convey and the creation of the right to have the deed registered. All that the surviving joint tenant received was a bare legal title. It would be
unjust in the extreme to hold that this operated to extinguish
the grantee's equitable right. Appellant's right of survivorship
was limited by her joint tenant's power of severance. She cannot now be permitted to object to this exercise of that power.
Neither is appellant within the class of persons intended to be
protected by the Torrens system. It was designed to encourage
reliance on the state of the registered title. Appellant has in no
way so relied."00
The policies outlined by the court are equally applicable to
land under the recording system. The recording act, as pointed
87. E.g., Iowa Land Title Standards § 4.4 (1950) ; Nebraska State Bar
Ass'n Proceedings,1949, 29 Neb. L. Rev. 231, 234 (1949) ; 21 Utah Bar Bull.
11-12 (Special Number, May, 1951).
88. Statutes are discussed in Volz, Wisconsin Practice Methods §§ 343347 (1949) ; Dye, Jointly Owned Property and Its Disadvantages [May, 1953]

J. of the Kan. Bar Ass'n 351, 357-358.

89. Klouda v. Pechousek, 414 Ill. 75, 110 N. E. 2d 258 (1953) ; Naiburg
v. Hendriksen, 370 Ill. 502, 19 N. E. 2d 348 (1939).
90. Id. at 507, 19 N. E. 2d at 351.
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out above, may possibly afford protection to a bona fide purchaser
from the surviving joint tenant. No authority exists, however, for
that conclusion. In view of the fact that joint tenancies are becoming more popular, it would be desirable to remedy this situation
by legislation.
Restraints on the power to sever; disabilities. In the absence
of an express restraint, courts are reluctant to find equitable grounds
for cancelling a severance at the request of the non-consenting
tenant. 91 The validity of express restraints on the power of severance is unsettled. In the only case of any consequence, a father
conveyed his property through a straw man to himself and his son
as joint tenants. The deed provided that neither party should sell
his interest without the consent of the other in writing. This
was held to be an invalid restraint on alienation. 92 Note that the
restriction is of the type commonly called a "disabling" as distinguished from a "forfeiture" restraint. The former is a mere
direction; it purports to make the interest conveyed inalienable
without attaching a penalty for attempted alienation. Disabling restraints are held to be invalid93 except in the field of spendthrift
trusts. This seems to be the basis for the court's decision, for it
remarked that the "restrictive paragraph was repugnant to the
grant and a restraint on the inherent right of alienation and therefore void."94 This is typical judicial language used in invalidating
disabling restraints.
Forfeiture restraints on estates in fee simple are usually avoided
on the basis of public policy.95 If there is a forfeiture restraint on one
tenant's privilege of severing a joint tenancy in fee simple, it is
likely to be held void. 96 It is likely also that a forfeiture restraint
on the privilege of severing a joint tenancy in a life estate would
be upheld. An analogy would be drawn to similar restraints on life
estates owned in severalty.
It might be argued that the presence of the restraint indicates
that a joint tenancy was not intended to be created. The deed might
91. Williams v. Williams, 68 R. I. 233, 27 A. 2d 176 (1942). A mother
and son owned land in joint tenancy. Relying upon this gift from the mother,
the son went into possession, paid taxes, made repairs, etc. Later the mother
conveyed to X and secured a reconveyance. The son's bill in equity to compel
his mother to execute conveyances to restore the joint tenancy was dismissed.
Held, the facts of the case do not support any equitable duty on the mother
to refrain from severing.
92. Smith v. Smith, 290 Mich. 143, 287 N. W. 411 (1939).
93. Gray, Restraints on Alienation 91, 134 (2d ed. 1895) ; Restatement,

Property § 405 (1944).
94. Smith v. Smith, 290 Mich. 143, 157, 287 N. W. 411, 416 (1939).
95. Restatement, Property § 406, comment a (1944).
96. Id., comment c (1944).
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be construed to create a joint life estate with a contingent remainder to the survivor. This would accomplish the purpose of the
restraint which is to provide an indestructible right of survivorship? 7 Since that is not in conflict with any policy of the law, the
deed might be reformed to carry out that intention.
A Texas case properly held that a collateral agreement between
the joint tenants prohibiting sale by one without the other's consent will not invalidate a conveyance made in violation of the
agreement s
A joint tenant may be under a disability to effect a severance
because of some rule of law which prevents him from alienating
without the consent of his cotenant or which makes his alienation
voidable. A familiar example of the former is found in legislation
forbidding the transfer of homestead property without the consent
of the owner's spouse. If the homestead is abandoned, the joint
tenancy may be severed without the consent of the cotenant. 9 A
conveyance severing the joint tenancy may be set aside by creditors
because it is a fraudulent conveyance 00 or because it was procured
through the fraud or undue influence of the conveyee. In the latter
situation, it is held that the surviving joint tenant has standing to
maintain suit to cancel the conveyance.' 01
II.

AGREEMENTS BETwEEN JOINT TENANTS TO SEVER

Although a devise by one tenant will not work a severance,
joint or mutual wills, executed by both tenants and disposing of
the land upon their death according to a plan which is inconsistent
with a survivorship right, will sever the tenancy. 10 2 Here it is the
agreement, not the will, that effects the severance.
97. In a case dealing with a legal remainder in joint tenancy in corporate
stock, a restraint on alienation was imposed on the joint tenants presumably
to obtain management of the corporation by the designated tenants. The
restraint was upheld since it was for a beneficial purpose. It was also stated
that the restraint was not objectionable because it would not continue for a
period longer than the lives of the joint tenants, thus seemingly confusing
the rule against restraints on alienation with the rule against perpetuities.
Peyton v. Wehrhane, 125 Conn. 420, 6 A. 2d 313 (1939).
98. Fitts v. Stone, 140 Tex. 206, 166 S. E. 2d 897 (1943).
99. Radtke v. Radtke, 247 Wis. 330, 19 N. W. 2d 169 (1945).
100. Campbell v. Drozdowicz, 243 Wis. 354, 10 N. W. 2d 158 (1943);
see note 34 supra and text thereto; Morgan v. Catherwood, 95 Ind. App. 266,
167 N. E. 618 (1929).
101. Reina v. Erassaret, 90 Cal. App. 2d 418, 203 P. 2d 72 (1949), 34
Minn. L. Rev. 245 (1950); Gillette v. Nicolls, 262 P. 856 (Cal. App. 1953).
102. In re Wilford's Estate, 11 Ch. D. 267 (1879); Berry v. Berry's
Estate, 168 Kan. 253, 212 P. 2d 283 (1949). In the latter case, the joint will
provided, 'Wedeclare it [the will] to be contractual." Suppose they cancelled the agreement?
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Contracts of a non-testamentary nature between the tenants will
also accomplish the same result if there is an intention to sever.
As might be expected, the cases are not clear on what constitutes
a sufficient manifestation of intention to sever. In one case the
execution of articles of partnership, although not referring specifically to the joint property, was held to be inconsistent with the
continuance of the joint tenancy. 08 The court seemed understandably eager to find a severance because the joint property was not
owned by tenants who were within a single family group. On
the other hand, an agreement executed in contemplation of a
divorce between the tenants was held to be a severance despite the
fact that the agreement provided that the property should "remain
in joint tenancy ...

until such property can be sold."'10 4 The effect

of the agreement upon survivorship arose before the land was
sold. In another case there was held to be a severance by the
mutual agreement of the brother and sister even though the severance was contingent upon the happening of an event which did subsequently occur before the question of severance became material. 0 5
If the parties expressly state in their agreement that the tenancy
shall not terminate, to what extent may the agreement constitute a
severance because it destroys one of the unities? Tindall v. Yeats'0 0
is a leading case. It was urged that there was a destruction of the
unity of possession because one tenant gave to the other the right
to exclusive possession for his life and the sole right to the profits
from the land. The agreement provided that the joint tenancy should
not terminate. The court held that a severance did not result as a
matter of law. The court seemed to feel that a severance requires
a conveyance of an estate in the land of a type which necessarily may
endure beyond the life of the conveyor and therefore alter the nor103. Williams v. Dovell, 96 A. 2d 848 (Md. 1953).

104. McDonald v. Morley, 15 Cal. 2d 409, 101 P. 2d 690 (1940). Compare Duncan v. Suhy, 378 Ill. 104, 37 N. E. 2d 826 (1941) to the effect

that a post-nuptial agreement prior to a separation of the parties was not
sufficiently clear to sever the joint tenancy when it stated that "[B]oth
parties.., agree that each party shall retain his or her one-half interest...."
105. California Trust Co. v. Anderson, 91 Cal. App. 2d 832, 205 P. 2d
1127 (1949). A mother, son and daughter owned stock certificates as joint
tenants. The children contracted as follows: "It is hereby agreed that in the
event our mother shall predecease both of us, all her estate left at such time
shall be ... divided share and share alike between us." Later the mother, then
the daughter died, and there was held to have been a severance. Since no provision was made in the agreement for a severance in the event one of the children should die before the mother, if the daughter had died first, apparently
the result would have been different. The case illustrates that the agreement
need not contemplate an immediate severance.Cf. Kurowski v. Retail Hardware Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 203 Wis. 644, 234 N. W. 900 (1931), discussed in
note 51 supra.
106. 392 Ill. 502, 64 N. E. 2d 903 (1946).
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mal right of survivorship. The agreement was tantamount to the
0 7
creation of a life estate in the one tenant.1
Severance by acts or conduct of the parties.A unilateral decision
to sever the tenancy, not acted upon by the tenant, does not sever
the tenancy."0 8 The commencement of an action to partition is not
a severance because the tenant may discontinue the action before
judgment. 00 The cases suggest the possibility of a severance where
the parties by a systematic course of dealing have indicated that
they regard themselves as tenants in common.'10 Probably implied
in fact contracts and oral agreements are contemplated by these
statements. In land cases, this raises questions of the Statute of
Frauds, part performance and estoppel, which are so unsatisfactorily dealt with in the few cases which exist that any conclusion
would be sheer conjecture.
It remains to consider a few cases dealing with miscellaneous
acts held not to constitute a severance. If a husband and wife are
joint tenants, a divorce does not sever a joint tenancy because, unlike the tenancy by entireties,"' x it does not depend upon the continuation of the marriage.""' A New York case held that a joint
tenancy in cattle was not severed upon the birth of calves since,
unlike a conveyance, "the act of birth was an act of nature" !"13 The
Wisconsin court, dealing with the effect of murder of one joint
107. See text discussion at notes 38-47 .supra.

108. Newman v. Youngblood, 394 Ill. 617, 69 N. E. 2d 309 (1946) (the
day before her death, the tenant informed her attorney that she had decided
to destroy her husband's right of survivorship).

109. Dando v. Dando, 37 Cal. App. 2d 371, 99 P. 2d 561 (1940) ; Ellison
v. Murphy, 128 Misc. 471, 219 N. Y. Supp. 667 (Sup. Ct. 1927). Is there any
reason why the tenancy could not be regarded as revived upon the discontinuance of the action if that result is deemed desirable as a matter of policy?

To avoid the rather arbitrary result of these cases, the tenant contemplating
partition must execute a conveyance to a straw man and secure a reconveyance. Another technicality which might better go unexplained to a layman.
See also note 9 supra and text thereto. An unappealed decree of partition is a
severance even though the sale has not been completed because the purchase
price has not been paid by the purchaser at the time the tenant dies. Schuck v.
Schuck, 413 Ill. 390, 108 N. E. 2d 905 (1952), 31 Chi-Kent Rev. 270 (1953).
110. See Bird v. Stein, 102 F. Supp. 399, 403-404 (S.D. Miss. 1952) ;
Duncan v. Suhy, 378 Ill. 104, 109, 37 N. E. 2d 826, 829 (1941); Haughabaugh
v. Honald, 3 Brev. *97, 98, 5 Am. Dec. 548, 549 (S.C. 1812).
111. 2 Tiffany, Real Property § 436 (3d ed. 1939); 2 American Law
of Property § 6.6 (1952).
112. Poulson v. Poulson, 145 Me. 16, 70 A. 2d 868 (1950). This was an
action for partition brought by W after her divorce from H. Held, as a result
of partition each is entitled to an undivided one-half interest. The court also
held that a statute giving a husband who was awarded a divorce because
of the fault of his wife "one-third ...

of all her real estate.

. .

which shall

descend as if she were dead.. . ." did not alter their shares so as to give him
an undivided two-thirds interest.
113. In re Ebdon, 198 Misc. 531, 98 N. Y. S. 2d 697 (Surr. Ct 1950),
36 Iowa L. Rev. 712 (1951).
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tenant by the other, did not feel inclined "to add murder of a cotenant to the approved methods by which one joint tenant may
convert the joint tenancy of the other into some different interest.... ." The status of the parties was preserved as though the victim were still alive, and when the wrongdoer subsequently died,
the victim's administrator acquired title by survivorship. 11" Under
the Wisconsin theory, the murderer could sever the joint tenancy
by conveyance immediately after terminating the spouse. It seems
unnecessary to point out that even Blackstone did not contemplate
this development in the law of severance.
III.

MORTGAGING THE PROPERTY

Cases turning on the effect of a mortgage executed by one of
the joint tenants are notable principally for their scarcity. Common
learning on the subject is that the mortgage destroys the "unity" of
interest and thereby irrevocably severs the jointure. 11 But the statements are very frequently supported by early cases decided when
a mortgage was a conveyance of the entire estate of the mortgagor,
subject to his right to obtain a reconveyance upon payment of the
debt secured. In 1709 the Chancery found that a severance resulted
from a mortgage executed by a joint tenant for a term of years.""0
But the reasoning of the court is not based on anything as impractical as a destruction of the unities. The very common-sense
explanation given was that a joint tenancy was an odious thing to
a court of equity; survivorship was a disadvantage to a property
owner because it deprived his estate of the property upon his death,
if his cotenant survived. 1 7 Eighty years later Exchequer announced
a similar conclusion, though by way of dictum. Giving examples
of acts amounting to severance, the court said:
"A mortgage (which is a still weaker case), will also sever the
jointure; but favor is shewn to severance for preventing what in
equity is considered as objectionable, i.e., the survivorship.""' 8
Similarly, In re Pollard's Estate,"9 decided in Chancery in 1863,
found that a mortgage executed by one joint tenant had destroyed
114. In re King's Estate, 261 Wis. 266, 52 N. W. 2d 884 (1952), [1953]

Wis. L.Rev. 567. See generally Note, 37 Iowa L. Rev. 582 (1952) ; 37 Minn.
L.Rev.71 (1952).
115. See 2 American Law of Property 9 (1952) ;2 Tiffany, Real Property 210 (3d ed. 1939) ;2 Walsh,Commentaries on the Law of Real Property
12-13 (1947).
116. York v.Stone, 1 Salk. 159, 91 Eng.Rep. 146 (1709).
117. Ibid.
118. Gale v.Gale, 2 Cox 136, 155, 30 Eng.Rep.63, 71 (1789).
119. 3 De.G.J.& S.541, 46 Eng. Rep. 746 (1863).
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the right of survivorship even though it had been discharged by
payment before any of the joint tenants died.
Although these cases were decided at a time when a mortgage
might at least have been thought to destroy unities of title and interest, unities are not mentioned and the reasons given by the courts
seem eminently sensible. Survivorship might well be thought odious
or objectionable when it was imposed arbitrarily on co-recipients
of interests in land. The common law presumption in favor of joint
tenancy raised a countervailing dislike in the minds of judges.
What seems to be the earliest American case on the subject
indicates an equally reasonable approach. In Lessee of Davidson v.
Heydon, 20 the court held that an assignment for the benefit of
creditors worked a severance, effective at least to protect the creditors against the grantees of the surviving joint tenant, who had not
joined in the assignment. Though the court said, "The assignment
changes the legal estate, and operates as a severance,''

it seems

an afterthought. The principal explanation given is that the assignment effected the same purpose as the bankruptcy laws, with less expense. Further, the court expressly saved the question of disposition of any surplus over the amount necessary to satisfy the creditors.12 2 If the legal estate referred to was changed irrevocably into
a tenancy in common the surplus would clearly pass to the personal
representative of the deceased assignor; no question worth saving
would have existed.
Seven years later, however, another Pennsylvania case held that
a mortgage had destroyed survivorship in language which smacks
of unities. Lessee of Simpson v. A"nrnons" 3 was an action in ejectment by a mortgagee under a mortgage executed by two of three
joint tenants; the mortgagors had died without discharging the
obligation. The court quite properly granted ejectment, but their
disposition of the issue of severance is far from clear. They said:
"As to the first, the court are of opinion that the mortgage was a
severance of the jointenancy. The interest of Baynton and Mor24
gan passed by it, but the interest of Wharton was not affected.'
While the result is desirable, the opinion clearly implies that the
severance occurred at the time the mortgage was executed. The
case, though old and cryptic, has been an important basis for statements 12 r that a mortgage totally destroys survivorship at the time
120. 2 Yeates 459 (Pa. 1799).
121. Id. at 463.
122. Id. at 462-463.
123.

1 Binney 175 (Pa. 1806).

124. Id. at 177.
125. See note 115 supra.
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of execution. This we think is utter nonsense. But the rule has been
assumed and, once assumed, explained on the principal ground
that a common law mortgage transferred legal title, thus destroying
the unities of title and interest. These unities could not be repaired
by a subsequent conveyance, since the title and interest thereby
created arose later than the title and interest of the non-mortgaging
joint tenant, thus violating the unity of time.' 26
There are but a few modern cases dealing with mortgages.
Hardin v. Wolf- r is one of them. A father procured a conveyance
to himself and his daughter as joint tenants. To prevent the daughter from conveying her interest or subjecting it to the claims of
creditors, he required her to execute a note and trust deed of her
interest to secure the note. The note did not represent an actual
obligation, however; the purpose was to ward off prospective purchasers from the daughter. The father thereafter brought an action
for partition. The court held that he could not obtain it because he
had contracted not to partition as long as the daughter provided a
home for him. Thus the court's statements that the mortgage did
not work a severance because it was not intended to be effective is
probably dictum. They did, however, assume that an effective
mortgage would sever, and cited for that proposition Lawler v.
Byrne, 218 which does contain a statement to that effect. It is an unconsidered dictum, however; severance there was accomplished by
a warranty deed. Partridge v. Berliner' 20 is another Illinois case
which may-but probably does not-hold that mortgage worked a
severance. A husband had procured a conveyance to himself and
his wife as joint tenants. He executed a conveyance to X for security
purposes; X later reconveyed. The court said that the conveyance
was a mortgage in effect and worked a severance, the husband and
wife thereafter holding in common. The joker is that the husband
had intended to give no interest to the wife in the first conveyance;
they held as joint tenants to the use of the husband before the
mortgage and as tenants in common to the use of the husband after
the reconveyance. If this is a holding, it is surely one without significance-the wife was not entitled to partition in any event. The
Maryland court has also volunteered the view that a joint tenancy
would be severed by a mortgage. 30 But again they neither ampli126. See 2 American Law of Property 9 (1952).
127. 318 Ill. 48, 148 N. E. 868 (1925).
128. 252 Ill. 194, 96 N. E. 892 (1911).
129. 325 Ill. 253, 156 N. E. 352 (1927).
130. See McPherson v. Snowden, 19 Md. 197, 230 (1862). Wolf v. Johnson, 157 Md. 112, 145 Ati. 363 (1929), held that the mortgage could be enforced after the death of the joint tenant-mortgagor; it did not question

SEVERANCE OF JOINT TENANCIES

1954]

fled nor explained the statement, and it was not necessary to the
decisions.
There is but one clear American holding on the subject. Wilkins
v. Young

3

1

might make a good examination question. A husband

and wife were joint tenants. The husband executed a mortgage to
X and a will devising the property to Y. He then died without
having satisfied the mortgage; the wife died later. Children of the
wife brought an action to quiet title against both X and Y. The
court, without exploring other possibilities, held that X's lien was
valid to the extent necessary for security and that the right of
survivorship had effectively passed the equity of redemption to
the wife, and ultimately to her heirs. Had the mortgage destroyed
survivorship, i.e., completely severed, the equity of redemption
would have passed to the devisee, Y.
Valsh describes this approach as ... simply impossible and
unthinkable. 1 3 82 One of two positions, he says, must be adopted.

Either the mortgage is a mere lien which would expire at the death
of the husband because his interest then ceases, or it works a complete severance as to the mortgaged interest by destruction of the
unities. "The latter view is sound, while the former view is impracticable and illogical."1 33 Walsh and Niles, writing in American
Law of Property, say that the case is wrong on "principle" because
1 34
the unity of interest was broken.
With all deference, it seems to us that the case is satisfactory.
The "principle" simply will not wash. Of course, there may be
reasons other than the "principle" for reaching that result. Walsh
suggests that it gives an unfair advantage to the mortgaging joint
tenant; if he survives he receives an unencumbered one-half, while
if he pre-deceases his cotenant the latter receives an encumbered
one-half. 3 1 But this is true only if the mortgagor dies first and if
the mortgage has not been satisfied at the time he dies. In other
words, the threat Walsh imagines exists, but it may never materialize. If and when it does, we can create a severance to meet the problem. The question can come up in another guise, of course. The
mortgagor may default during the lifetime of both of the joint
whether survivorship existed between the co-tenants after the mortgage was
executed.
131. 144 Ind. 1, 41 N. E. 68 (1895). Wells, Mortgage by a Joint Tenant
-Torrens System, 9 Aust. L. J. 322, 323 (1936), suggests that a similar result
might be reached in Australia.
132. 2 Walsh, op. cit. supra note 115, at 12.
133. Ibid. In Walsh, Mortgages §§ 5-6 (1934), he took the position that
the lien theory is the only sensible one.
134. See 2 American Law of Property 9-10 (1952).
135. See Walsh, op. cit. supra note 115, at 13.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:466

tenants. But foreclosure will deprive the non-mortgaging owner of
no more than will a voluntary sale by the mortgagor. Severance
occurs at that time. Again we meet the problem when it arises, without conjuring up imaginary horribles. More sins have been committed in the name of mutuality-basically Walsh's position-than
3 6
this world dreams of.'

There is respectable authority for the idea that the right of survivorship may be "suspended" during a temporary alienation of
part of one joint tenant's interest and revived when the temporary
alienation has terminated. 37 It seems to us that substantially the
same result will be reached by suspension as is achieved by refusing
to decide the question until it is asked. The latter seems more
realistic, but there are those who prefer Coke on Littleton to
realism.
We do agree that Walsh's alternative position, that the mortgage is a "mere lien" on the interest of the mortgagor and will expire,38 is undesirable. He points out that the practical effect would
be that joint tenants would be unable to mortgage individually
because no lender would accept such precarious security. We doubt
that the mortgages of individual joint tenants are in much demand
in the mortgage market, but there is no reason to erect barriers to
whatever alienability is possible.
The difference between a "mere lien" and a conveyance of title
resulting in shattered unities has troubled courts as well. Both
Maryland and Illinois have attempted to explain their statements
that mortgages sever while judgment liens do not on the ground
that they observe a title or semi-title theory of mortgages as opposed to a lien theory. 13 9 More than twenty years ago Sturges and
Clark demonstrated140 that this distinction will not bear scrutiny.
There is no evidence that it has acquired vitality since then.
This discussion of the effect of mortgages has assumed a mortgage executed by only one joint tenant. Suppose that the mortgage
is executed by all of them? Presumably this transaction has no
destructive effect because it does not disturb the proportion of
ownership.'41
136. See 1 Corbin, Contracts § 152 (1950) and McClintock, Equity § 68

(2d ed. 1948) for examples of the harm the mutuality idea has caused in other
areas.
137. See Co. Litt. *185 a; Challis, Real Property *296; note 47 supra.
138. See 2 Walsh, op. cit. supra note 115, at 13.
139. See Eder v. Rothamel, 95 A. 2d 860, 863 (Md. 1953) ; Van Antverp
v. Horan, 390 Ill. 449, 453, 61 N. E. 2d 358, 360 (1945).
140. Sturges & Clark, Legal Theory and Real Property Mortgages,
37 Yale L. J. 691 (1928).
141. The Illinois court, which makes a fetish of severing, made no men-
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IV.

CREDITOR PROCESS

A problem difficult to separate from mortgages on an analytical
basis is that of liens imposed on the interest of one joint tenant by
operation of law rather than by consent. Yet seemingly inconsistent
results are reached.
The question most commonly raised in the cases is whether a
judgment lien on the interest of one joint tenant will sever. There
seems to be no exception from the rule that the event which first
brings the lien into existence under state practice-rendition of the
judgment, docketing, or the like--does not create a severance. The
question arises when the debtor-joint tenant dies after creation of
the lien and before any enforcement process has been initiated. The
surviving joint tenant takes the property free of any claim of the
judgment creditor.

142

It is difficult to see why this situation differs from a mortgage
upon which the mortgagor has defaulted. In each case a debt is past
due and in each case the debt is secured by a lien upon land. In
most states the respective liens are enforced by identical or substantially similar processes. Yet the universal rule is that the judgment lien does not work a severance, while the commonly stated
and almost uniformly approved view is that the mortgage does.
The judgment lien can be fortified by a levy on the property.
This may or may not help. The Illinois court has decided that it
does not. In Van Antwerp v. Horan143 the debtor-joint tenant died
after execution had issued and a levy had been made but before sale
of the property. The surviving joint tenant sought and secured an
injunction against the sale. The court held that the levy did not
in any way increase the interest held by the judgment creditor already holding a judgment lien. Since that court was already committed to the view that the interest of the debtor is not diminished
by the creation of the initial lien, 14 4 there was little more to be said.
It is questionable whether there is any authority to the contrary.
tion of it in Liese v. Hentz, 326 Ill. 633, 158 N. E. 428 (1927), where two

joint tenants had joined in a mortage. But there is fully as much reason to
sever when both join in a mortgage as when they execute a contract to convey. See the discussion of that problem at notes 53-84 ,epra and text thereto.
142. Zeigler v. Bonnell, 52 Cal. App. 2d 217, 126 P. 2d 118 (1942);
People's Trust & Savings Bank v. Haas, 328 Ill. 468, 160 N. E. 85 (1928);
Eder v. Rothamel, 95 A. 2d 860 (Md. 1953) ; Musa v. Segelke & Kohlhaus
Co., 224 Wis. 432, 272 N. W. 657 (1937) ; 111 A. L. R. 168 (1937) and Note.
See Gau v. Hyland, 230 Minn. 235, 41 N. W. 2d 444 (1950) passin.
143. 390 Ill. 449, 61 N. E. 2d 358 (1945). The Minnesota court has cited
Van Antwerp with evident approval. Gau v. Hyland, supra note 142, at 239,
41 N. W. 2d at 447 (1950). The cases deny that a judgment lien causes a diminution of interest. At best this begs the question, at worst it denies the fact.
144. People's Trust & Savings Bank v. Haas, 328 Ill. 468, 160 N. E.
85 (1928).
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Lessee of Davidson v. Heydon445 held that an assignment for the

benefit of creditors by one joint tenant worked a severance. But the
court added:
"The execution issued on the judgment has the same effect. If
Dougherty had died immediately afterwards, a venditioni exponas might have been taken
out and the lands sold forthwith,
1' 4
without any scire facias.'

The Wisconsin court has indicated an interest in this view. In
Musa v. Segelke & Kolhaus Co., holding that a judgment lien alone
did not sever, the court explained away a text statement based on
the Heydon case by saying that an execution having the stated
effect must have issued in order to create a severance. 47 The reference is cryptic; the case does not indicate that a lien obtained by
levy would-or would not-have that effect in Wisconsin. But a
subsequent case implies that it might. In Campbell v. Drozdozwicz"4
a husband and wife were joint tenants. He conveyed to the wife
and she in turn to a daughter before judgment was rendered against
the husband on February 5; the husband died on February 13. The
opinion does not disclose whether a judgment lien existed, but it is
clear that no levy had been made. The court affirmed a judgment
that the conveyances were fraudulent and avoidable to the extent
necessary to satisfy the judgment. At one point in the opinion, the
court said,

49

"As the joint tenancy was destroyed and severed upon Drozdowicz's conveyance of his interest to his wife, it was not necessary to also effect a severance by levying an execution on such
interest prior to his death."
The words seem clearly to assume that a lien obtained by levy
would prevent survivorship from cutting off the lien creditor.
The court goes further, however. It says that in view of the
short time-eight days-elapsing between rendition of judgment
and death, it would be unreasonable to require an attachment or
levy within that brief period to preserve the creditor's right to recover. 150 If this be thought to mean that a judgment creditor could
145. 2 Yeates 459 (Pa. 1799).

146. Id. at 463. See Co. Litt. *184b.

147. 224 Wis. 432, 437, 272 N. W. 657, 659 (1937).
148. 243 Wis. 354, 10 N. W. 2d 158 (1943). Other aspects of the case
are discussed in the text at note 34 supra. There is something unusual about
a case in which the creditor reaches the property only because the debtor
made a fraudulent conveyance.
149. Id. at 360, 10 N. W. 2d at 160. In Greiger v. Pye, 210 Minn. 71,
297 N. W. 173 (1941), execution was levied upon the interest of a joint
tenant one week before the tenant attempted to convey. The court treats severance as resulting from the sale rather than from the levy, but the choice
was not material to the decision.
150. 243 Wis. 354, 361, 10 N. W. 2d 158, 161 (1943).
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reach the property by levying upon it in the hands of the survivor
it is startling indeed, though not, we think, undesirable. The writer
of a note in the Wisconsin Law Review so construes it; he regards
it as an unfortunate dictum which should not be followed. 151 What
is probably the correct explanation is that the court was not thinking about severance. The statement is made in response to a suggestion that an action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance cannot
be maintained unless execution has been returned unsatisfied. The
court was not talking about severance at that point in the opinion.
Thus far, the cases hold that a judgment lien does not sever
and that a lien created by levy has no greater effect. The next step
in the enforcement process is sale. The only case in point-Jackson
v. Lacey,15 2 again from Illinois-purports to hold that execution
sale does not sever. Expiration of the period of redemption is required; actual issuance of a sheriff's deed may be necessary. The
case is difficult to understand. H and W were joint tenants. A
creditor of H levied on and sold H's interest; W purchased at the
sale. TV died within the year permitted for redemption, and it is
clear that no redemption had been made at the time of her death.
Thereafter H sold his interest to another, and the heirs of W
claimed a one-half interest in the property on the theory that the
sale had severed, destroying survivorship. The only theory on which
H could take to the exclusion of W's heirs is that he took her interest by survivorship. But she had two interests, one in her capacity
as an original joint tenant and the other as purchaser of H's interest
at the sale. H might take her interest as original co-owner by survivorship despite the fact that by his conduct he had materially
prejudiced her rights. But no survivorship right could apply to the
interest TV purchased at the sale, unless she expressly purchased as
a joint tenant with her husband. There is no evidence that that was
the case. Nor could he take that interest in full under the Illinois
law of intestate succession. 5 3 Yet the vendee of H prevailed.
The only basis on which this case can be explained is that the
court omitted to give a highly relevant fact-that H or his vendee
redeemed within the period allotted under Illinois law. If so, there
would be no reason to sever, and survivorship should still apply.
But the language would lead to preposterous results. Suppose that
H and TV are joint tenants and a creditor of H sells his interest on
execution to P. This time H dies within the period of redemption.
It would seem that W would prevail over P despite the fact that P
151. Stevens, Real Property, [1947] Wis. L. Rev. 54, 55.
152. 408 IM.530, 97 N. E. 2d 839 (1951), 30 Chi-Kent Rev. 189 (1952).
153. 1 111. Rev. Stat. c. 3, § 162 (State Bar. ed. 1953).
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paid value for the interest. This seems an intolerable result, but the
language of the Illinois court leads to that. Further, unless a highly
important fact is added to those recited by the court, that is exactly
the case the Illinois court thought it was deciding. All the cases
cited by the court lead up to that situation. None of them hold or
intimate that a debtor himself may prevail over his creditors merely because his cotenant has predeceased him.
The court emphasized that the sheriff's deed was considered the
severing event in an earlier Illinois case. 4 Thus it may be possible
that expiration of the redemption period alone may not suffice.
Frequently sheriff's deeds are not obtained for some time after the
lapse of the redemption period. But it seems impossible that this
purely ministerial act can have any effect on the question of
severance.
Under Minnesota practice, the certificate of sale issued by the
sheriff at the time of sale is the deed as well; if the debtor or junior
lienholders do not redeem within the allotted time the certificate
becomes indefeasible.1 55 Would the Minnesota court find that the
certificate of sale worked a severance? Or would it await the end of
the redemption period?
Execution sales of real property are not infrequently set aside
because the price bid and accepted was grossly inadequate. 151 Would
a court find that the right of survivorship was in force after the
sale was avoided, or would the sale be thought to have irrevocably
57
destroyed survivorship? Surely the former view would prevail.
As a purely practical observation, it is hard to see how any price
bid for the interest of a joint tenant could be said to be inadequate
in the light of the present case law. The interest is so uncertain it
is worthless.
So far, a judgment lien alone does not destroy the joint tenancy,
a lien obtained by levy may but probably does not, and the sole
case on the subject says that sale alone does not. The next step,
chronologically speaking, is that the certificate of sale has issued
and the period of redemption, if any, has expired. There is ample
uniform authority that severance has occurred and that the right of
154. See Johnson v. Muntz, 364 Ill.
482, 490, 4 N. E. 2d 826, 830 (1936).
155. Minn. Stat. § 550.22 (1949) ; Form No. 70, Uniform Conveyancing
Blanks, 29 Minn. Stat. Ann. 394 (1947). Professor Stefan A. Risenfeld referred to the interest of the purchaser between sale and expiration of the
period of redemption as a "lien-plus."
156. E.g., Johnson v. Avery, 60 Minn. 262, 62 N. W. 283 (1895).
157. Cf. Reina v. Erassarret, 90 Cal. 2d 418, 203 P. 2d 72 (1949), 34
Minn. L. Rev. 245 (1950), revd on other grounds, 103 Cal. App. 2d 258, 229
P. 2d 92 (1951).
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survivorship is wholly destroyed. 58 This result seems perfectly
satisfactory.
We have noted before that we find no difference in practical
effect between a lien created by mortgage and a lien created by creditor process. Yet there is a clear inclination to give to one effect
entirely different from that given to the other. Can this be attributable to differences in the process of creation, in that a mortgage
is normally, but not necessarily, executed voluntarily, while judgment, levy and sale usually, but again not necessarily, are taken
against the will and over the protest of the debtor? If this is the
reason, it seems an unconscious one; with almost no exception the
distinction is not found in the cases.
"Almost" in the last sentence is designed to save Goff v. Yauinan.o a Wisconsin case. A statute provided that old-age assistance benefits should become liens on all real property, ".... including
joint tenancy interests . . ." of the recipient and remain enforceable

"... after transfer of title of the real property by sale, succession,
inheritance, or will .... 1,10
Benefits were paid to Emma Goff upon

her application, and after her death the county asserted a lien
against the interest she held as a joint tenant. The surviving joint
tenant sued to cancel the claim as a cloud on her title. The Supreme
Court of Wisconsin upheld the claim of the county. They were justifiably troubled by Musa z. Segelke & Kolhaus Co., 161 another
Wisconsin case quite plainly holding that a judgment lien did not
sever, i.e., that the survivor prevailed over the creditor. So they said
that the statute did not create the lien, despite its express language;
the lien was created by the application for and receipt of assistance,
whereby the recipient voluntarily subjected his real property to the
security plan provided by the statute. Thus the transaction is quite
like a mortgage, which severs because it is voluntary. They cite the
mortgage cases discussed above - but they decline to indicate
whether a mortgage would destroy survivorship in Wisconsin !1,12
158. Hilborn v. Sloane, 44 Cal. App. 115, 185 Pac. 982 (1919) ; Young

Y. Hessler, 72 Cal. App. 2d 67, 164 P. 2d 65 (1945) ; Johnson v. Muntz, 364

II1.482, 4 N. E. 2d 826 (1936) ; Thornburg v. Wiggins, 135 Ind. 178, 34 N. E.
999 (1893) ; Fladung v. Rose, 58 Md. 13 (1882) ; Ames v. Chandler, 265
Mass. 428, 164 N. E. 616 (1929); Midgley v. Walker, 101 Mich. 583, 60
N. W. 296 (1894).
159. 237 Wis. 643, 298 N. W. 179 (1941), 134 A. L. R. 952 (1941) and
Note.
160. Wis. Stat. § 49.26(4) (1943).
161. 224 Wis. 432, 272 N. W. 657 (1937). See note 167 infra.
162. Wis. Stat § 230.455 (1951) now answers the question-survivorship is not affected by the mortgage, but the interest in the hands of the
survivor is subject to the lien. See note 167 infra.
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In other words, assistance liens sever because mortgages do, even
though mortgages may not.
This seems like a splendid result, despite the devious method
used to attain it. The case only slightly implies that the survivor
would not take any surplus over the amount needed to discharge
the lien, and the issue was not involved in the case. But two things
have happened since. One is bad. In Estateof Feiereisen'63 the court
explicitly held that survivorship between the joint tenants was
totally destroyed by application for and receipt of assistance, although the argument to the contrary was squarely put to them. The
heirs of the deceased recipient took any surplus in value over the
amount necessary to repay the county.
The other is good. In 1945 the Wisconsin legislature amended
the statute by adding the following:
"Such lien shall not sever a joint tenancy nor affect the right
of survivorship except that the lien shall be enforceable to the
extent that the beneficiary had an interest prior to his decease."''"
The "except" clause clearly preserves the Goff rule. The first clause
preserves the right of survivorship between the tenants despite the
existence of the lien. But what of Estate of Feieresen? This is a
legitimate question which gets an unusual answer-the legislature
changed the rule of that case before it was ever decided! Prescience
like this is rare indeed. But the answer is not facetious; the Fejereisen case did not purport to apply the amendment of 1945. It expressly purported to apply what the court thought was the Goff
rule because the facts thought relevant arose before the amendment. 165 The precise holding of Goff was not involved in Feiereisen;
nobody contested the county's lien. But the court thought that because Goff severed enough to protect the county, it also destroyed
survivorship between the parties. The trap they fell into is one
that has deceived many others. It is the concept that either you
sever or you do not sever, with no wishy-washy in-between nonsense.
Recall that the Wisconsin court thought that an assistance lien
"severed" because it was something like a mortgage, and it was a
general rule that a mortgage severed. Paradoxically, they were
right because they were wrong. The only modem holding on the
effect of a mortgage is Wilkins v. Young, 6 6 in which a mortgage
163. 263 Wis. 53, 56 N. W. 2d 513 (1953).
164. Wis. Laws 1944-1945, c. 594 § 1. The statute has been amended in
other particulars, but the quoted language is unchanged. Wis. Stat. § 49.26 (5)
(1951). Neb. Rev. Stat § 68-215.09 (1953 Cumm. Supp.) provides for com-

plete severance.
165. 263 Wis. 53, 56, 56 N. W. 2d 513, 514 (1953).
166. 144 Ind. 1, 41 N. E. 68 (1895). See text note 131 supra.
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severed enough to protect the mortgagee but kept the right of survivorship active enough to pass the right of redemption to the survivor. Wisconsin clearly reaches an identical result with old-age
assistance liens because of the statute. Further, legislation has resolved the mortgage question in Wisconsin by adopting the Wilkins
1
rule. 67

The only other case in the country on this specific point is Gau
v. Hyland,'0 a Minnesota case holding that the surviving joint
tenant took free and clear of a $2,000 assistance lien. To the Minnesota court, the problem was very simple. The transaction, whether
voluntary or involuntary, does not sever unless it divests the joint
tenant of a part of his estate, thereby doing violence to one of the
unities. The whole question was resolved by Sir Edward Coke some
time ago. He pointed out that a mere "charge" or "burden" on the
interest of one joint tenant did not effect a severance. A lien is a
mere charge (though authority for this is Words and Phrases and
American Jurisprudence rather than Coke) and in no sense an
interest or estate in land. Thus the lien dies with the expiration of
the deceased's interest. "To hold otherwise would impute to the
legislature not only a plain misuse of language having a well-settled
meaning, but also an incompetency, which the advised use of the
language belies."' ' 0 9 Further, said the court, the Goff case is unsound
because it runs counter to rules which have endured from Coke's
time to the present day. The court expressly refused to follow it
because it was unsound,
''
overruling it. 170

"...

entirely aside from the legislative act

167. Wis. Stat. § 230.455 (1951). Wis. Laws 1944-1945, c. 549 § 2 provided:

"No real estate mortgage, chattel mortgage, conditional sales contract,
lien effected pursuant to the provisions of chapter 289 or other lien or
charge upon the joint tenancy interest of a joint tenant to any joint tenancy

shall not defeat the right of survivorship in such joint tenancy, but the
joint tenancy interest of such joint tenant to which upon his death the
surviving joint tenant succeeds shall be subject to such . . . [lien]."

(italics supplied)
Wis. Laws 1944-1945, c. 143, § 19 struck the erroneously inserted "not."
The judgment lien created by Wis. Stat. § 270.79 (1951) would seem to be
an

...

. other lien or charge...." Musa v. Segelke & Kohlbaus Co., 224 Wis.

432, 272 N. W. 657 (1937), may have been overruled by the statute. But
Wis. Laws 1949, c. 364 again amended by striking out "or other lien or
charge," and inserting "chapter 49 and so that the first sentence now reads:
"No real estate mortgage, chattel mortgage, conditional sales contract,

lien effected pursuant to the provisions of chapter 49 and chapter 289
upon the joint tenancy interest. . . ."

Chapter 49 creates the old age assistance lien; chapter 289 covers mechanic's

and materialmen's liens and a large number of fairly unimportant statutory

liens for services. It does not include judgment liens. Is Musa still law in
Wisconsin?
168. 230 Minn. 235, 41 N. W. 2d 444 (1950).
169. Id. at 242, 41 N. W. 2d at 449.
170. Id. at 245, 41 N. W. 2d at 450.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:466

Deciding modem social legislation problems by reference to a
book written when the Elizabethan Poor Laws were hot off the
press leads to foolish results. And the legislative act did not overrule the Goff case, but affirmed it. To the first objection someone
may reply that the case involved not only old-age assistance problems but real property law, and that certainty and predictability are
important in the latter. We are all for certainty, but the court refused to follow the only case on the subject. Did they thereby promote certainty? There is certainty on the matter now that the case
is decided, but, given the opportunity, law might as well be certainly
right as certainly wrong.
Other types of involuntary creditor's process which may affect
joint tenancies and the right of survivorship include bankruptcy
and mechanic's or materialmen's liens. Section 70(a) (5) of the
Bankruptcy Act

71

1

vests in the trustee, as of the date of filing the

petition, property which the bankrupt could by any means have
transferred. There is no doubt that this includes the interest of a
bankrupt joint tenant 17 Suppose, however, that the trustee elects
to abandon the property as not beneficial to the estate.17 3 Will the
right of survivorship again become effective, or was it irrevocably
destroyed when it passed to the trustee? The latter view seems to
serve no good purpose; the former is sound. There is an interesting
possibility in this. Imagine that a creditor obtains a judgment lien
six months before the bankruptcy petition is filed. The lien will
not be invalidated by Section 67(a) 17 4 because it was obtained more
than four months prior to bankruptcy. Because the lien is valid, the
trustee may elect to abandon the property as over-encumbered and
useless to the estate. 7 5 If the bankrupt thereafter dies before the
lien is enforced the survivor will take the property free of the
claims of lien creditor and trustee. It is interesting, but there is no
evidence that it has ever occurred.
Mechanic's liens are more perplexing and equally uncertain. The
Nebraska court recently indicated'7 6 that a lien for improvements
authorized by the wife-joint tenant could not be enforced against
the property in the hands of the surviving husband when he had not
consented to the improvement and in fact was unaware of it. On the
171. 30 Stat. 565 (1898), as amended, 11 U. S. C. § 110 (Supp. 1952).
172. In re Blodgett, 40 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Wis. 1953); Schram v.
Tobias, 40 F. Supp. 470, 472 (E.D. Mich. 1941).
173. See 4 Collier, Bankruptcy 1040 (14th ed., Moore, 1942).
174. 30 Stat. 564 (1898), as amended, 11 U. S. C. § 107 (Supp. 1952).
175. 4 Collier, Bankruptcy 1217, 1223 (14th ed., Moore, 1942).
176. Barry v. Barry, 147 Neb. 1067, 26 N. W. 2d 1 (1947) (alternative
holding).
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other hand, Wisconsin provides by statute that a mechanic's lienas well as a host of other statutory liens-will be effective against
the property in the hands of the survivor, but does not destroy
17

survivorship between the partiesY. '

The suggestion of the Wisconsin court in Goff v. Yaumina: 78 is
that a mortgage is a voluntary transfer while a judgment lien is not,
and the cases can be aligned on this basis despite explicit repudiation 17 1 of the distinction by the Minnesota court. Other forms of
creditors' liens can be fitted into the involuntary category. But what
would such an alignment prove? Voluntariness is a relative thing.
The free choice of a debtor threatened with immediate ruin if he
does not promptly execute a mortgage is probably more restricted
than that of a man who light-heartedly borrows money he is unable
to repay, and which is certain to wind up as a judgment against
him. But to the extent that it exists, it may be a fair index of
something frequently fundamental-the intention of the actor. Joint
tenancies are created when the parties intend to create them; perhaps they should be destroyed only when the parties intend to
destroy them. But there are two objections to this seemingly valid
proposition. The first is that actual intent must rarely, if ever,
exist. Warranty deeds may evidence some, but mortgages and judgment liens do not. Of course, courts constantly "discover" intent
in wills, deeds, contracts, and the like. But intent so discovered is
the basis of the second objection: it does not appear on tract indexes
or abstracts of title. Marketability is an important element in land
ownership and should be promoted whenever possible. One of the
primary motives for selection of joint tenancy over other methods
of land holding is to avoid the expense and formality of probate
proceedings. But this is an illusory gain if quiet-title. actions are
made necessary to insure marketability. Of course, a substantial
number of people-principally lawyers-may think that this is good:
joint tenancy is an unwise means of holding land because of the
danger of voluntary severance,1 80 inheritance and income tax complications'," and the practical though mercenary reason that it spoils
177. Wis. Stat. § 230.455 (1951). See note 167 supra.
178. 237 Wis. 643, 645-650, 298 N.W. 179, 180 (1941).
179. Gau v. Hyland, 230 Minn. 235, 239, 41 N. W. 2d 444, 447 (1950).
180. See Harbert, The Ownership of Real Estate in Joint Tenancy,
37 111. B. J. 449 (1949); Mann, Some Current Problems Involving Joint
Tenancies, 40 Ill. B. J. 370 (1952) ; Nossaman, The Joint Tenancy Problem,
27 Calif. S. B. J. 21 (1952).
181. See Marshall, Joint Tenancy, Taxwise and Otherwise, 40 Calif. L.
Rev. 501, 504 (1952) ; Moodie, Some of the Dangersof Joint Tenancy, 29 Neb.
L. Rev. 235 (1949) ; Wright, Some PracticalAspects of Joint Ownership, 22
Olda. B. J. 1328 (1951).
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the probate business. If uncertainty actually discouraged the use of
this somewhat unwise method of land holding we might promote
uncertainty to achieve its abolition. But this is hardly a scientific
means of law making. Further, it does not work. Despite all the
uncertainty, joint tenancies grow more rather than less popular,
182
and courts more tolerant of their creation.

Since joint tenancies do exist, some standard more objective
than actual intent must be devised. The best seems to be that a
joint tenant will not be permitted to take by survivorship if he has
acted to the actual-not merely potential-prejudice of his cotenant.813 There is, for example, no need to strike down a right of
survivorship at the time a mortgage is executed because the mortgage could, if facts A and B and C concur, harm the non-mortgagor. When those facts do occur, we can find a severance. This
kind of determination can be made from facts which appear of
record and are noted in abstracts of title. By this means we can
satisfy the legitimate needs of conveyancers and at the same time
avoid the application of empty concepts like the four unities rule.
In dealing with the relationship between the joint tenants, this is
not a radical suggestion. The actual law is in accord with this kind
of analysis, Walsh and Illinois dicta to the contrary notwithstanding.
But the law which governs the relationship of involuntary creditors to the joint tenants is at the same time much more clear and
far less satisfactory. There is an inclination to protect the mortgagee
long before he is in any need of aid, while judgment creditors are
denied any assistance. Why is the law so solicitous of a mortgagee,
who presumably entered into the transaction with either knowledge
or means of knowledge at his disposal? He knew he was buying an
uncertain interest, and the law might, without doing substantial
injustice, let him bear the risk.
Contrast this with the unfavorable treatment accorded one who
has far less control over his fate. A common judgment creditor
today is a person injured by the negligent conduct of the debtor.
By definition, he is both an innocent and an involuntary creditor.
Yet the uniform and wide-spread view is that the judgment lien will
not protect him from the early death of the debtor-joint tenant. To
the extent that there is authority dealing with the effect of additional
182. See Therrien v. Therrien, 94 N. H. 66, 68, 46 A. 2d 538, 539
(1946), repuditating the rule that A cannot convey to A and B as joint
tenants. See also Runions v. Runions, 186 Tenn. 25, 207 S. W. 2d 1016
(1948), 1 A. L. R. 2d 242 (1948) and Note.
183. See text at note 44 supra.
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steps in the enforcement process, it is discouraging. The time betwreen commencement of an action and the expiration of the period
of redemption will rarely be less than three years in a metropolitan
area. That is a long time to pray for the continued good health of
the debtor. The lien creditor deserves better treatment than he has
received to date.
V. CONCLUSION

"Unities" may have had value at one time but they are useless
concepts today. The standard explanation for the requiremefit is
that all of the joint tenants were regarded in the eyes of the law
as but one individual, who owned from the time "he" acquired
title until the last survivor died. Somehow it is thought that this
fiction of "oneness" would be too transparent if title, for example,
were acquired by co-owners at different times.184 Yet a single individual may acquire part ownership of a tract at one time and the
rest later; hardly anybody supposes that he must therefore be two
persons. Little justification is ever given for the existence of the
four unities rule; the tendency is to attribute it to blindness on the
part of the common law lawyers. Whatever the reasons for the rule
may be, these are the results: if one of the unities is lacking at the
time two persons become co-owners, they are tenants in common
rather than joint tenants; if one of the unities is destroyed after
the estate has been created, the joint tenancy is thereby destroyed
and they become tenants in common.
A possible evolution of the rule is this. Joint tenancy was the
ideal form of co-ownership in the feudal system. Land was kept in
large tracts and was thus better able to render services to the lord.
Tenancy in common would result in constant subdivision. Joint
tenancy was a temporary form of co-ownership, and in a generation
the tract would again be held by only one tenant. It is easier to rely
on the loyalty of one man than two. These reasons, and perhaps
others, made joint tenancy so much preferable to tenancy in common that the latter was completely unknown. 85 What kind of coownership then resulted when a unity was lacking? Joint tenancythere was no alternative. Joint tenancy was more than a presumption, it was a rule of law.
But the rule which so nobly served the ends of feudalism was a
burden to its victims. Land ownership was virtually the only form
184. See 2 American Law of Property 4 (1952) ; 2 Walsh, op. cit. .rupra

note 115, at 2.
185. See 3 Holdsworth, History of English Law 126-127 (4th ed. 1935);
2 Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law 20 (2d ed. 1923).
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of wealth and the major indicia of political and social rank and preferment. Yet only one of the co-owners could pass these things to
his heirs. Feudalism declined and the reasons for the absolute rule
diminished with it. Another less burdensome form of co-ownership
arose, but the presumption was in favor of the older. As time passed
and chivalry withered, the newer form of ownership was in fact
the most satisfactory. The scope of the presumption had to be
restricted. How? Through fiction, the device so popular with common law lawyers. The reason survivorship exists is because all
the owners are deemed to be one person. The presumption looks
as strong as ever but it finds less and less application. Joint tenancies
are harder to create and easier to destroy when once created. Once
again owners of property have increased their rights at the expense
of the feudal system. It seems more than coincidence that an even
more important device for avoiding feudal burdens is developing
simultaneously-the practice of transferring real estate to feoffees
to uses. 186 Littleton refers to unities in the vaguest terms, 8 7 and he
made a will disposing of real estate enfeoffed to others to his use.,8
Most of this is sheer surmise, of course, but it at least gives
some explanation other than pure mystery to the evolution of the
unities doctrine. Its day of service is past, however, and it should
be retired. American states have, by either statute or decision,"8 ,
abolished the presumption it was designed to restrict. Instead of
ameliorating a rule which created an unwanted right of survivorship, it now destroys a survivorship created by the expressed desire
of the co-owners. There is currently a great tendency to let clear
intention create survivorship, despite an absent unity. 190 But the
doctrine persists when the courts are considering the termination
of existing joint tenancies.
The explanation most frequently given is that we are "hostile"
to survivorship. But the reasons for the ancient hostility have vanished. It is one thing to say that there is a presumption against the
creation of survivorship and quite another to say that we must
destroy it at every opportunity. American law does not impose
survivorship, but there seems to be no particular policy against its
voluntary creation or continuance when once created. In any event,
the four unities have nothing to do with the question.
One very practical inclination to find a severance arises out of
186. 1 American Law of Property §§ 116-118 (1952); 4 Holdsworth,
History of English Law 414-417 (2d ed. 1937).
187. See, e.g., Littleton, Tenures § 292 (Wambaugh trans. 1903).
188. Id. at xlvii.
189. See 2 American Law of Property § 6.3 (1952).
190. See note 182 supra.
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the federal income tax laws. Many cases of survivorship currently
being questioned involve lands acquired during the nineteen-thirties
at less than half of the present market price. If the property passes
by survivorship, the survivor takes with the depreciated original
cost as the capital gain basis; if a severance during the lifetime of
the co-owners can be found, the property passes to the survivor
with the market value at the time of death as the basis. 91 This may
result in a substantial tax saving when the survivor sells the property. But this is a recent development; it cannot explain an attitude
of one hundred years duration.
The true explanation seems to us to be that courts and writers
have not thought seriously about the problem.
191. Int. Rev. Code § 113 (a) (5). See Marshall, supra note 181 at
515-518.

